Chapter 6 • The Right to a Fair Trial: Part I – From Investigation to Trial 6.1.2 Searches International human rights law provides no detailed rules about the lawfulness of searches, but in this respect too the European case-law may provide some guidance. It is worthy of note, however, that the following case did not concern the issuance of a search warrant to the police but the granting of a warrant to a private party in civil proceedings. In the Chappel case, which did not concern a criminal case but a copyright action, the European Court had to examine the compatibility with article 8 of the European Convention of a search carried out in the applicant’s business premises for the purpose of securing evidence to defend the plaintiff’s copyright against unauthorized infringement. The Government accepted that there had been an interference with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private life and home, and the applicant, for his part, agreed that the search was legitimate under article 8(2) for the protection of “the rights of others”.41 The question that had to be determined by the Court was thus whether the measure was carried out “in accordance with the law” and whether it was “necessary in a democratic society”. The relevant search order was a so-called “Anton Piller order”, which is an interlocutory court order intended to preserve evidence pending trial; it is granted on an ex parte application without the defendant’s being given notice and without his being heard. The Court was satisfied in this case that the search was based on English law that complied with the conditions both of accessibility and of foreseeability. As to the former condition, the relevant legal texts and case-law were all published and thus accessible, and as to the latter, “the basic terms and conditions for the grant of this relief were, at the relevant time, laid down with sufficient precision for the ‘foreseeability’ criterion to be regarded as satisfied”; this was so although there could be “some variations” between the content of the individual orders.42 When examining whether the measure concerned was “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court observed, moreover, that the order was accompanied “by safeguards calculated to keep its impact within reasonable bounds”, i.e. (1) it was “granted for a short period only”; (2) “restrictions were placed on the times at which and the number of persons by whom the Plaintiffs’ search could be effected”; and further, (3) “any materials seized could be used only for a specified purpose”.43 In addition, the plaintiffs or their solicitor had given a series of undertakings and “a variety of remedies was available to the applicant in the event that he considered the order to have been improperly executed”.44 The Court did however accept that there were some “shortcomings in the procedure followed” when the order was carried out, in that, for instance, it must have been distracting for Mr. Chappel to have the searches by the police and the plaintiffs carried out at the same time; yet they were not deemed “so serious that the execution of the order” could, “in the circumstances of the case, be regarded as disproportionate to 41 Eur. Court HR, Case of Chappel v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 30 March 1989, Series A, No. 152-A, p. 21, para. 51. 42 Ibid., para. 56 at p. 24. 43 Ibid., p. 25, para. 60. 44 Ibid., loc. cit. Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 227