Chapter 4 • Independence and Impartiality of Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers Supreme Court. As to the subjective test, there was no evidence of personal bias of the individual judges of the Supreme Court,86 but, under the objective test, the conclusion was different. In the view of the Court, the legal opinion given by the President in submitting a cassation petition could not be regarded as neutral from the parties’ point of view, since, “by recommending that a particular decision be adopted or quashed, [he] necessarily becomes the defendant’s ally or opponent”.87 The European Court added that, “when the President of the Criminal Division not only takes up the prosecution case but also, in addition to his organisational and managerial functions, constitutes the court, it cannot be said that, from an objective standpoint, there are sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to the absence of inappropriate pressure”. Further, the fact that the President’s intervention was prompted by the judge at first instance only aggravated the situation.88 The notion of impartiality is also applicable to jurors, and, in the case of Sander, the European Court found a violation of article 6(1) after a juror had made racist remarks and jokes and the judge’s subsequent direction had failed to dispel the reasonable impression and fear of a lack of impartiality. The Court accepted that, “although discharging the jury may not always be the only means to achieve a fair trial, there are certain circumstances where this is required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention”.89 In this particular case, “the judge was faced with a serious allegation that the applicant risked being condemned because of his ethnic origin”, and, moreover, “one of the jurors indirectly admitted to making racist comments”; given “the importance attached by all Contracting States to the need to combat racism”, the Court considered “that the judge should have acted in a more robust manner than merely seeking vague assurances that the jurors could set aside their prejudices and try the case solely on the evidence”.90 It concluded that, “by failing to do so, the judge did not provide sufficient guarantees to exclude any objectively justified or legitimate doubts as to the impartiality of the court”, which was not, consequently, “impartial from an objective point of view”.91 In a second case concerning a juror who had allegedly uttered a racist slur, the Court also emphasized that article 6(1) of the Convention “imposes an obligation on every national court to check whether, as constituted, it is ‘an impartial tribunal’ within the meaning of that provision ... [where] this is disputed on a ground that does not immediately appear to be manifestly devoid of merit”.92 In the case of Remli the court concerned had not made such a check, and, consequently, the applicant had been deprived “of the possibility of remedying, if it proved necessary, a situation contrary to the requirements of the Convention”.93 86 Ibid., para. 31. 87 Ibid., para. 35. 88 Ibid., para. 36. 89 Eur. Court HR, Case of Sander v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 9 May 2000, para. 34; for the text of the judgment, see http://www.echr.coe.int/. 90 Ibid., loc. cit. 91 Ibid. For other cases involving the notion of impartiality, see e.g., Eur. Court HR, Case of Diennet v. France, judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A, No. 325-A (no violation); and the cases mentioned under the section dealing with “Military and other special courts or tribunals”. 92 Eur. Court HR, Case of Remli v. France, judgment of 30 March 1996, Reports 1996-II, p. 574, para. 48. 93 Ibid., loc. cit. 138 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers