Chapter 6 • The Right to a Fair Trial: Part I – From Investigation to Trial manner described as soon as the charge is first made by a competent authority”.58 The Committee has in this respect specified that “this right must arise when in the course of an investigation a court or an authority of the prosecution decides to take procedural steps against a person suspected of a crime or publicly names him as such. The specific requirements of subparagraph 3(a) may be met by stating the charge either orally or in writing, provided that the information indicates both the law and the alleged facts on which it is based”.59 In the view of the Committee, this also means that the “detailed information about the charges against the accused must not be provided immediately upon arrest, but with the beginning of the preliminary investigation or the setting of some other hearing which gives rise to a clear official suspicion against the accused”.60 The duty to inform the accused under article 14(3)(a) of the Covenant is thus also “more precise than that for arrested persons under” article 9(2) of the Covenant and, as long as the accused has been promptly brought before a judge as required by article 9(3), “the details of the nature and cause of the charge need not necessarily be provided to an accused person immediately upon arrest”.61 In an earlier case the Committee held, however, that “the requirement of prompt information ... only applies once the individual has been formally charged with a criminal offence”, and that it does not, consequently, “apply to those remanded in custody pending the result of police investigations”, a situation covered by article 9(2) of the Covenant.62 The question is, however, whether the reasoning in this latter case is consistent with the Committee’s views as expressed in its General Comment or the earlier cases referred to. In applying the principle of prompt information, the Committee concluded that article 14(3)(a) had not been violated in a case where the author complained that he had been detained for six weeks before being charged with the offence for which he was later convicted. The Committee concluded simply that it transpired from the material before it that the author had been “informed of the reasons for his arrest and the charges against him by the time the preliminary hearing started”.63 Article 14(3)(a) had however been violated in a case where the victim had not been informed of the charges against him prior to his being tried in camera by a military court that sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment and 15 years of special security measures; furthermore, he had never been able to contact the lawyer assigned to him.64 58 General Comment No. 13 (Article 14), in United Nations Compilation of General Comments, p. 124, para. 8; emphasis added. 59 Ibid., loc. cit.; emphasis added. 60 Communication No. 561/1993, D. Williams v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 8 April 1997), UN doc. GAOR, A/52/40 (vol. II), p. 151, para. 9.2; emphasis added. 61 Communication No.702/1996, C. McLawrence v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 18 July 1997), UN doc. GAOR, A/52/40 (vol. II), p. 232, para. 5.9. 62 Communication No. 253/1987, P. Kelly v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 8 April 1991), UN doc. GAOR, A/46/40, p. 247, para. 5.8; emphasis added. 63 Communication No. 561/1993, D. Williams v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 8 April 1997), UN doc. GAOR, A/52/40 (vol. II), p. 151, para. 9.2. 64 Communication No. R.14/63, R. S. Antonaccio v. Uruguay (Views adopted on 28 October 1981), UN doc. GAOR, A/37/40, p. 120, para. 20 as compared with p. 119, para. 16.2. Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 233