Chapter 6 • The Right to a Fair Trial: Part I – From Investigation to Trial proceedings. However, Rule 42(A)(iii) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia makes express reference to this right, as does article 55(2)(b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has unequivocally held that “there can be no doubt that the right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognized international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6. ... By providing the accused with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities these immunities contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to securing the aims of Article 6.”86 Is the right to remain silent absolute? View of the European Court of Human Rights In this particular case, the applicant was arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and cautioned by the police officer pursuant to article 3 of the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 that, although he did not have to say anything unless he wished to do so, his silence might be treated in court as supporting any relevant evidence against him; he was subsequently cautioned several times. The applicant was arrested coming down the stairs in a house in which alleged IRA terrorists were apprehended together with their victim. During his trial for the offence of conspiracy to murder, the applicant remained silent but was again cautioned that the court, in deciding whether he was guilty, might take into account against him “to the extent that it considers proper” his “refusal to give evidence or to answer any questions”.87 He was found guilty of the offence of aiding and abetting the unlawful imprisonment of the man against whom there was a conspiracy to murder, but acquitted on the other charges. The European Court refrained in this case from giving “an abstract analysis of the scope of” the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination and, in particular, of what constitutes in this context ‘improper compulsion’”, because what was at stake was “whether these immunities are absolute in the sense that the exercise by an accused of the right to silence cannot under any circumstances be used against him at trial or, alternatively, whether informing him in advance that, under certain conditions, his silence may be so used, is always to be regarded as ‘improper compulsion’”.88 86 Eur. Court HR, Case of John Murray v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 February 1996, Reports 1996-I, p. 49, para. 45; emphasis added. 87 Ibid., p. 38, para. 20. 88 Ibid., p. 49, para. 46. Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 241