4. The following summarises my conclusions: (A) Human Rights Act In respect of Chester’s claim under the Human Rights Act, which only relates to elections to the European and United Kingdom Parliaments (para 2), I would decline the Attorney General’s invitation to this Court not to apply the principles in Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2005) 42 EHRR 849 (“Hirst (No 2)”) and Scoppola v Italy (No 3) (2012) 56 EHRR (paras 34-35) (“Scoppola”), but also decline to make any further declaration of incompatibility with the Convention rights (paras 39 - 42). (B) European law a. In respect of McGeoch’s and Chester’s claims under European law, which can at most relate to elections to the European Parliament and municipal authorities (paras 9, 45 and 46), I conclude that European law does not incorporate any right to vote paralleling that recognised by the European Court of Human Rights in its case-law or any other individual right to vote which is engaged or upon which, if engaged, they are able to rely (paras 46-47, 58, 59, 63-64 and 68). b. Had European law conferred any right to vote on which McGeoch and Chester can rely: i. the only relief that might have been considered would have been a generally phrased declaration that the legislative provisions governing eligibility to vote in European Parliamentary and municipal elections in the United Kingdom were inconsistent with European Community or Union law but that would not have appeared appropriate in the particular cases of Chester and McGeoch (para 72); ii. the general ban on voting in European Parliamentary and municipal elections could not have been disapplied as a whole (para 73); iii. it would not have been possible to read the RPA section 3 or EPEA section 8 compatibly with European law (para 74); Page 3