liability of the Community for damage caused to individuals by
unlawful legislative measures adopted by its institutions.
….
55 As to the second condition, as regards both Community liability
under Article 215 and Member State liability for breaches of
Community law, the decisive test for finding that a breach of
Community law is sufficiently serious is whether the Member State
or the Community institution concerned manifestly and gravely
disregarded the limits on its discretion.
56 The factors which the competent court may take into
consideration include the clarity and precision of the rule breached;
the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or
Community authorities; whether the infringement and the damage
caused was intentional or involuntary; whether any error of law was
excusable or inexcusable; the fact that the position taken by a
Community institution may have contributed towards the omission,
and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices
contrary to Community law.
57 On any view, a breach of Community law will clearly be
sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite a judgment finding the
infringement in question to be established, or a preliminary ruling or
settled case-law of the Court on the matter from which it is clear that
the conduct in question constituted an infringement.”
These principles were reiterated in Case 392/93 R v HM Treasury, Ex p British
Telecommunications plc [1996] QB 615, an example of a case where the Court of
Justice held that the breach had not involved a manifest and grave disregard of
European law, and Case 278/05 Robins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
[2007] ICR 779, where the Court emphasised the importance of the breadth of the
legislative discretion in that case and the fact that the provisions of the relevant
directive did not make it possible to establish with any precision the level of
pension protection which it required.
78.
Turning to apply these principles to the present cases, I make the twin
assumptions (again contrary to my conclusions) that (a) European Union confers
rights to vote on individual citizens of the Union, subject to the United Kingdom’s
legislative discretion to introduce limitations, but that (b) the present general
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