prohibition on prisoner voting is contrary to principles paralleling those stated by the Strasbourg court in Hirst (No 2) and Scoppola and/or the general European Union principle of equality or non-discrimination. On those assumptions, the second and third conditions for any personal claim arise for consideration. 79. The second condition is that the breach was sufficiently serious. This in turn depends, under European law, upon whether Parliament, the relevant United Kingdom authority, can be said manifestly and gravely to have disregarded the limits on its discretion. This must be judged taking into consideration “the clarity and precision of the rule breached; the measure of discretion left by that rule to the national or Community authorities; whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary; whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable” (para 77 above). In relation to voting by convicted prisoners, the United Kingdom legislature enjoyed a wide margin of discretion. Further, this is in a context where there has been and remains a considerable lack of certainty about what the parameters of that discretion may be. This is evident from a reading of the Strasbourg case-law, particularly the two Hirst judgments, the Chamber judgment in Frodl v Austria (2010) 52 EHRR 267 and the Grand Chamber judgment overruling the Chamber judgment in Scoppola v Italy, in which the European Court of Human Rights has sought to identify the relevant considerations and to apply them to particular facts. Accordingly, it is clearly very arguable that this condition is not met. 80. I will not however say more about the application of the second condition in this case, in view of one further factor, which I prefer to leave open. The test stated in the European authorities postulates some degree of examination of the conduct of the relevant national authority. Since the relevant United Kingdom authority is here Parliament in enacting and continuing in force the relevant legislation, an assessment of some of these matters (particularly whether the infringement was intentional or involuntary, excusable or inexcusable) may threaten conflict with the constitutional principle enshrined in the Bill of Rights 1688 that domestic courts in the United Kingdom ought not to “impeach or question” proceedings in Parliament. To avoid this, it may perhaps be necessary to approach a claim for damages in a case like the present on an objective basis, without regard to what has actually happened or been said in Parliament. The decision in R v Secretary of State, Ex p Factortame (No 5) [2000] 1 AC 524 does not appear to throw any light on this problem, because there does not seem there to have been any call to consider Parliamentary debates. On any view, however, the fact of Parliamentary activity, referred to in Greens and continuing, can no doubt be taken into account. 81. The third condition is that there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties. Page 41