82. In relation to both the second and the third conditions, it must in my opinion be relevant to have regard to the particular position of the present appellants. The questions are whether, in refusing them the vote, the United Kingdom has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion and whether they have sustained damage directly caused by the United Kingdom’s breach of an obligation owed to give each of them a right to vote. In Strasbourg case-law, according to the majority in Hirst (No 2), a claimant can complain that the law in general is incompatible with the Convention rights, without showing that it was or would have been incompatible with such rights to deprive him in particular of the vote. But to award a convicted prisoner damages without showing that European Union law required him, rather than some other prisoner or prisoners, to have the vote would be positively inconsistent with the conditions stated in Francovich and Ex p Factortame. 83. On that basis, I consider that any claim for damages by McGeoch and Chester must on any view fail. McGeoch is still serving the punishment part of his sentence resulting from the combination of his life and consecutive fixed-term sentence. There can, in the light of Scoppola, be no question about the United Kingdom’s entitlement to deprive a prisoner in his position of the vote. Chester is in his post-tariff period of his life sentence, but it is notable that the European Court of Human Rights deliberately refrained from endorsing the original Chamber view or Judge Caflisch’s concurring minority view (para 40 above) that there is a critical distinction between the tariff and post-tariff period. Further, in Scoppola, the Strasbourg court accepted that disenfranchisement could continue for life in the case of sentences of five years or more. This was subject only to the right, three years after release, to apply for “rehabilitation”, which would be granted upon his displaying “consistent and genuine good conduct”: see para 22 above. The requirement to display good conduct in order to regain voting rights was thus regarded as not only relevant, but acceptable. The Strasbourg court accepted as a legitimate aim “enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law”. Continuing detention for a period lasting so long as “necessary for the protection of the public” (paras 30 and 40 above) can be no less relevant and acceptable as a criterion for continuing deprivation of the right to vote during that period. The underlying consideration, that the offender is not fully rehabilitated or ready to participate responsibly in the country’s democratic life, is the same in each case. This is underlined by the passage from the Grand Chamber’s recent decision in Vinter quoted in para 41 above. Conclusions 84. My conclusions on the issues argued on this appeal are summarised in para 4 above. It remains only to consider whether the resolution of this appeal necessitates a reference to the European Court of Justice. This depends upon whether it depends upon the determination of any question of European law which Page 42