was no justification for this different treatment of comparable situations in a context which fell within the scope of European law, that is voting by nationals residing outside their own member state. 64. Supporting this is also the consideration that the Court accepted that “the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand … falls within the competence of each Member State in compliance with Community law” (Spain v United Kingdom, para 78, Eman and Sevinger, para 45). If the qualification “in compliance with Community law” were meant to require scrutiny by reference to European Community law of all national limitations affecting European Parliamentary elections for their non-discriminatory quality even where no other link with European law was established other than that the elections were European Parliamentary elections, that could, depending upon the intensity of the scrutiny, effectively erode the general principle that the Court was accepting. Position if the principle of non-discrimination had been engaged 65. This brings me to consideration of the nature and intensity of the scrutiny which would be required, if (contrary to my conclusion in paras 63-64) the principle of non-discrimination were to be viewed as all-embracing in the manner advocated by Mr O’Neill and Mr Southey. In both Strasbourg and Luxembourg case-law, discrimination issues are customarily described as involving a two-stage process, consisting of first the identification of an appropriate comparator and then, if one is found, examination of the justification for any difference in treatment: see e.g. Edward and Lane, European Union Law (EE, 2013) para 6.125, citing numerous authorities. The exercise as presented is neither a unitary nor an entirely open one, or a court would in every case be required to ascertain the differences between two different situations and ask whether, assessing such differences and their significance as best it could, it considered the differences in their treatment to be fair or justified. There must be basic comparability before the court embarks on considering justification. Thus, in Eman and Sevinger itself the Court observed (para 57) that “the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination, which is one of the general principles of Community law, requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified…” The principle was reiterated in Case C‑485/08 P, Gualtieri v European Commission [2010] ECR I-3009, para 70 with reference to Eman and Sevinger as Page 34