well as other cases including Case C-227/04 P Lindorfer v Council of the European Union [2007] ECR I‑6767. 66. As the Court noted in Case C-267/06 Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I-1757, para 73, it is for the national court to determine whether two persons are in a comparable position. That does not however mean an identical position. The referring court in Maruko identified a gradual movement towards recognising equivalence of life partnership and marriage, meaning that, although the two were not identical, persons of the same sex could be regarded as being in a situation comparable to that of spouses so far as concerns the survivor’s benefit at issue in that case. The Court of Justice in Case 147/08 Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg approved that approach, saying: “41 Accordingly, the existence of direct discrimination, within the meaning of the Directive, presupposes, first, that the situations being weighed up are comparable. 42 In that regard, it should be pointed out that, as is apparent from the judgment in Maruko … at [67]—[73], first, it is required not that the situations be identical, but only that they be comparable and, secondly, the assessment of that comparability must be carried out not in a global and abstract manner, but in a specific and concrete manner in the light of the benefit concerned.” 67. Gualtieri was an appeal from the General Court and provides a contrasting example. The claimant complained that she received a lower daily allowance on the basis of the proximity of her spouse’s residence to her place of secondment than she would have done if she had been single, but living in a de facto union. The Court upheld the General Court’s conclusion that the two situations were not comparable, saying: “75 …. it must be observed that, although de facto unions and legally recognised unions, such as marriage, may display similarities in certain respects, those similarities do not necessarily mean that those two types of union must be treated in the same way. 76 In those circumstances, the decision to apply the criterion of matrimonial legal status appears neither arbitrary nor manifestly inappropriate in relation to the objective of reducing the allowances paid to SNEs [national experts seconded to the Commission] when they are in a situation in which it can be assumed that they bear Page 35