1. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 8, 1995 elections was concerned? 2. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 11, 1998 elections was concerned? 3. May petitioners proclamation as Mayor under the May 11, 1998 elections be cancelled on account of the disqualification case filed against him during the May 8, 1995 elections? 4. May private respondent, as the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, be proclaimed as Mayor in the event of petitioners disqualification? The Commission on Elections is the agency vested with exclusive jurisdiction over election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Unless the Commission is shown to have committed a grave abuse of discretion, its decision and rulings will not be interfered with by this Court. [13] Guided by this doctrine, we find that no violation of due process has attached to the COMELECs June 22, 1998 Resolution. Petitioner complains that while the COMELEC reinstated SPA No. 95-213, it conducted no hearing and private respondent presented no evidence.[14] Yet, this does not equate to a denial of due process.As explained in Paat v. Court of Appeals[15]-x x x. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard (Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. V. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995). One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings (Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995). In administrative proceedings moreover,