6/25/2020 Details of 1999 (Gyo-Tsu) 35 | Judgments of the Supreme Court generally, even by taking into account various elements which the Diet is empowered to consider, such inequality is presumed to be beyond the reasonable discretion of the Diet, and unless special grounds which justify such an inequality are presented, it has to be regarded as unconstitutional. This is the opinion of the Supreme Court as expressed in the judgments of the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court of April 14, 1976, November 7, 1983, July 17, 1985, January 20, 1993, and does not require any change. (2) The reason why Article 3, para.2 of the Law on the Establishment of the Constituency Council set the above-mentioned criterion is because by allocating one seat in advance regardless of the population number, and thus allocating more seats to prefectures with relatively small population numbers, it was intended to ensure that people who live in those prefectures can have their views reflected in national politics. However, the said provision also sets out a criterion that the demarcation should be based on the consideration that the ratio of the difference in population between constituencies should be less than 1:2, and thus has given sufficient consideration to the equality of the value of the vote. As mentioned earlier, when demarcating the boundary of constituencies, the most important and fundamental criterion is to keep the number of voters or the population per member as equal as possible, but the Diet is empowered to consider other elements. Prefectures are unavoidable and fundamental elements when demarcating the boundaries, and so are density of population, and geographical elements, as well as the problem of to what extent social changes such as the concentration of people in large cities accompanied by the phenomenon of the depopulation of areas where the population is leaving and how this should be reflected on the demarcation of constituency boundaries and the allocation of seats. These are the elements which should be considered by Diet. Therefore, the fact that Diet has taken into account all these elements and determined the criteria for the demarcation of constituency boundaries as provided by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the said provision cannot be regarded as an excess of discretion by the Diet in relation to the equality in the value of votes. The Provisions on the Demarcation of the Boundaries were enacted in accordance with Article 3 of the Law on the Constituency Council. The result, according to the National Census of Population closest to the amendment conducted in October 1990, was that the difference in population between constituencies is at the maximum 1: 2.137 and the Survey closest to the election in question in this case, conducted in October 1995, was 1:2.309. The fact that already at the time close to the amendment, the difference exceeded 1:2, which was supposed to be the basis of demarcation by virtue of Article 3, para.1, leaves room for argument. However, this does not mean that such demarcation is automatically against the criterion set out in this provision, and taking into consideration that the criterion as provided by this provision is in itself not against the Constitution as mentioned earlier, the above difference in the value of the vote cannot be said to have reached the level of unreasonableness in general, and therefore, the said provision cannot be found to be against articles 14, para.1, 15, para.1, or 43, para.1 of the Constitution. 4 (1) The amended Law on Public Election, as mentioned above, closely involves political parties in the election. This is understood to be for the purpose of making the election system so that it is based primarily upon policies and political parties as indicated in the report of the Eighth Council on the Electoral System. As mentioned above, the determination of the specific system of the election for members of the House of Representatives is left to the broad discretion of Diet. The Constitution does not provide for political parties, but naturally presupposes their existence. Political parties are the indispensable element of the basis of Dietary democracy and are the most influential medium for formulating the political will of the people, and therefore, it is evident that when determining the design of the electoral system for members of the House of Representatives, making the election system so that it is primarily based upon policies and political parties is within the scope of discretion granted to Diet. https://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=458 6/23