Chairman of GECOM. Nor is there anything to suggest that His Excellency
acted otherwise than in good faith. In light of our views above on the process
that should be followed, however, and given the imposition on the Leader of the
Opposition of criteria that were not sanctioned by the Constitution and the
absence of cogent reasons for deeming unacceptable the candidates and lists
provided, we have no choice but to conclude that the process that was followed
in the appointment of Justice Patterson was flawed and in breach of Article
161(2). To the extent that this judgment contradicts anything that was stated in
Gaskin, the latter is overruled.
JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE ANDERSON, JCCJ:
[31]
This appeal originated in the appointment by His Excellency Mr David Granger,
President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, of Mr Justice James Patterson
to be the Chairman of the Guyana Elections Commission. Article 161(2) of the
Constitution of Guyana obliges the President to make the appointment, “from a
list of six persons, not unacceptable to the President, submitted by the Leader of
the Opposition”. In fact, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Bharrat Jagdeo, had,
on three separate occasions, submitted separate lists each with the names of six
persons. Mr Justice Patterson was not among the list of 18 persons thus
submitted. His Excellency found each of the lists to be unacceptable but without
giving any specific reason for their unacceptability. The President then resorted
to the proviso in Article 161(2) which empowered him to make a unilateral
appointment, “if the Leader of the Opposition fails to submit a list as provided
for”, and pursuant to that provision appointed Mr Justice Patterson. The
Appellant in these proceedings contends that this appointment was flawed and
in breach of the Constitution.
[32]
For substantially the reasons advanced by the learned President, I agree that the
process followed in the appointment of Justice Patterson was fatally flawed and
did not comport with the constitutional requirements. The history of its drafting
and the wording of the provision in Article 161(2) clearly anticipate meaningful
consultation, dialogue and compromise between the President and the Leader of