STRØBYE AND ROSENLIND v. DENMARK JUDGMENT paragraph 71 above). The Court observes that it also seems to be the case in other European States, including Albania, Moldova, Serbia and Turkey. Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that there was common ground between the national laws of the Contracting States to uncouple disenfranchisement from deprivation of legal capacity. 112. Nor does the Court discern any common ground at the international and European level in this respect. It recalls, on the one hand, that Article 29 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities sets out that States Parties shall guarantee to persons with disabilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis with others. Moreover, in its report of 30 October 2014 on Denmark, the United Nation Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities expressed concern that persons who were deprived of their legal capacity under section 6 of the Guardianship Act were not allowed, at the time, to vote or to stand for election in parliamentary, municipal, regional or European Parliament elections, or referendums (see paragraphs 66 and 70 above). On the other hand, the Court observes that the Venice Commission in its Opinion no. 190/2002 had a more cautious approach, accepting that under certain cumulative conditions, provision may be made for depriving individuals of their right to vote (see paragraph 68 above). 113. The Court notes the applicants’ submission that the margin of appreciation should have been narrow, presumably narrower than that applied by the Supreme Court. The Court agrees that although the margin of appreciation is generally wide under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see, for example, Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, §§ 105-106, ECHR 2006-IV), it is substantially narrower when a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society, such as the mentally disabled (see Alajos Kiss, cited above, §§ 41 and 42). In the present case, however, the Court reiterates that the mentally disabled were not in general subject to disenfranchisement; nor were persons under guardianship by virtue of section 5 of the Guardianship Act – as stated above, only those persons covered by section 5, who, after an individualised judicial evaluation, had also been found legally incompetent by a court under section 6 of the Guardianship Act, were subject to disenfranchisement. The Court therefore agrees with the Government and the Supreme Court, that the legislation at issue significantly differed from the legislation examined in Alajos Kiss (cited above), where all persons, whether under full or partial guardianship, were subject to an automatic, blanket restriction in respect of suffrage. In the Court’s view, there is therefore no basis for finding that the Supreme Court in its judgment of 18 January 2018 overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to it. 114. It is correct, though, as pointed out by the applicants, that apart from the individualised judicial evaluation of their legal capacity under 31