STRØBYE AND ROSENLIND v. DENMARK JUDGMENT 129. The Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a difference in treatment (see, for example, Molla Sali (cited above) § 136; Fábián, cited above, § 114; and Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359/09, § 108, ECHR 2014). The scope of this margin will vary according to the circumstances, the subject-matter and the background (see, inter alia, Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 42184/05, § 61, ECHR 2010). (b) Application of the general principles to the present case 130. Referring to the reasoning set out under its examination of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Court is satisfied that the difference in the treatment of the applicants, who had been deprived of their legal capacity at the relevant time, pursued a legitimate aim, and that there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. 131. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention of the Convention. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, 1. Decides to join the applications; 2. Declares the applications admissible; 3. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; 4. Holds that there is no violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 February 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Stanley Naismith Registrar Marko Bošnjak President 35