STRØBYE AND ROSENLIND v. DENMARK JUDGMENT granted in 2016. At that time the right to vote had been extended to the greatest extent possible, without having to resort to an amendment to the Constitution. 89. Lastly, the Government pointed to the fact that other European countries had made exceptions for persons without legal capacity with regard to the right to vote, and that Contracting States should be allowed a wide margin of appreciation in determining what procedures should be followed in order to assess mentally disabled persons’ fitness to vote. 2. Submissions by the third party 90. The European Network of National Human Rights Institutions, a Belgium-based NGO, submitted, inter alia, that recent changes in legislation, jurisprudence and practices across the Contracting Member states showed that there was a consensus, and common values, emerging around the principle that the voting rights of persons with disabilities should be guaranteed – including those of persons who were subject to a restriction or removal of their legal capacity. That consensus could equally be inferred from various resolutions, opinions, statements and recommendations from international and regional human rights bodies, which had repeatedly emphasised that the automatic link between the right to vote and one’s legal capacity disproportionately infringed upon the political rights of persons with disabilities. 3. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles 91. The Court refers to its relevant case-law, as outlined in the judgment of Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, ECHR 2005-IX: “57. [T]he Court has established that [Article 3 of Protocol No. 1] guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see MathieuMohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, pp. 2223, §§ 46-51). ... 58. The ... rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are crucial to establishing and maintaining the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law ... 59. ... [T]he right to vote is not a privilege. In the twenty-first century, the presumption in a democratic State must be in favour of inclusion. ... Universal suffrage has become the basic principle (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, p. 23, § 51, citing X v. Germany, no. 2728/66, Commission decision of 6 October 1967, Collection 25, pp. 38-41). 60. Nonetheless, the rights bestowed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for implied limitations and Contracting States must be allowed a margin of appreciation in this sphere. 61. ... The Court reaffirms that the margin in this area is wide (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, p. 23, § 52, and, more recently, Matthews v. the United 26