Cite as: 541 U. S. 509 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
because the FMLA was targeted at sex-based classifications,
which are subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, "it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state
constitutional violations" than in Garrett or Kimel, both of
which concerned legislation that targeted classifications subject to rational-basis review. 538 U. S., at 735-737. Title
II is aimed at the enforcement of a variety of basic rights,
including the right of access to the courts at issue in this
case, that call for a standard of judicial review at least as
searching, and in some cases more searching, than the standard that applies to sex-based classifications. And in any
event, the record of constitutional violations in this caseincluding judicial findings of unconstitutional state action,
and statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence of the
widespread exclusion of persons with disabilities from the
enjoyment of public services-far exceeds the record in
Hibbs.
The conclusion that Congress drew from this body of evidence is set forth in the text of the ADA itself: "[D]iscrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as ...
education, transportation, communication,
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and
access to public services." 42 U. S. C. § 12101(a)(3) (emphasis added). This finding, together with the extensive record
of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject
for prophylactic legislation.
to the FMLA, that public-sector parental leave polices "'diffe[r] little"'
from private-sector policies; (3) evidence that 15 States provided women
up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only 4 States provided
for similarly extended paternity leave; and (4) a House Report's quotation
of a study that found that failure to implement uniform standards for parenting leave would "'leav[e] Federal employees open to discretionary and
possibly unequal treatment,"' H. R. Rep. No. 103-8, pt. 2, p. 11 (1993).
Hibbs, 538 U. S., at 728-733.