As IFES has outlined previously,14 the ICCPR General Comment 29 on Article 4 offers additional clarity and detail on the boundaries of the derogation clause. First and foremost, certain rights are considered to be so fundamental that they are nonderogable even in times of extreme emergency: the right to life; the right to be free from torture and other inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to be free from slavery or servitude; freedoms of thought, conscience and religion; and the right to be free from retroactive application of criminal laws. While political and electoral rights are not among those that are nonderogable, states must meet two preliminary conditions to invoke ICCPR Article 4 in a way that impacts these rights: “the situation must amount to a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, and the State party must have officially proclaimed a state of emergency … for the maintenance of the principles of legality and rule of law at times when they are most needed.”15 General Comment 29 clearly states that “not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” and if countries consider invoking Article 4 to declare a state of emergency, “they should carefully consider the justification and why such a measure is necessary and legitimate in the circumstances.”16 Finally, General Comment 29 also provides that emergency measures must be “exceptional,” and “the restoration of a state of normalcy where full respect for the Covenant can again be secured must be the predominant objective of a State party derogating from the Covenant.” From this framework, IFES has identified four indicators that help to understand whether state actions during this time of crisis are within the guardrails provided by international principles.17 The emergency measures must be: ƒ Proportional: The measures taken must be commensurate to the problem. ƒ Nondiscriminatory: The measures must not discriminate on the basis of individual or community characteristics, including, but not limited to, gender or gender identity, language, religion, social or ethnic origin, disability or sexual orientation. ƒ Temporary: The measure must be specifically limited in duration and make provisions for an end point. ƒ Limited in geographic and material scope: The measures must be appropriately narrow and targeted to the problem, in both geographic scope and significance. Hence, while international principles allow for election postponements because they allow for the derogation of certain fundamental rights during an emergency, it is equally clear that an election postponement can only be justified under the limited circumstances outlined above, with strict guardrails in place and with a time horizon. Clear consideration also needs to be given as to whether emergency provisions, including election postponement, are “justifiable” based on the nature of the emergency. State of emergency provisions are usually developed to respond to immediate and significant emergencies such as natural disasters and are not primarily designed to respond to a prolonged health crisis. While a health crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic may present exceptional lingering circumstances and effects, it may not necessarily “threaten the life of the nation” on an ongoing basis. Finally, General Comment 29 also emphasizes the importance of notification and transparency regarding emergency provisions and decision-making. These principles provide an important framework for states to consider when making decisions around the timing of a postponement, the geographic and material scope of a postponement and the circumstances that will allow for the resumption of the electoral process. International Foundation for Electoral Systems -7-