of the potential triggers for a potential adjournment is “an epidemic notice given under section 5(1) of the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006 being in force.”23 As these country examples illustrate, it is important to clarify where the rules around term limits and electoral deadlines reside in the hierarchy of laws. As IFES has written about previously, an understanding of the hierarchy of laws is fundamental to the rule of law, as it dictates how the different levels of law will apply in practice.24 This helps determine whether provisions already exist that allow for postponements in exceptional circumstances, or if not, how easy the relevant term limits and deadlines are to modify. A legislative deadline or term limit may be easier for lawmakers to adjust during an emergency than a constitutional deadline. Or, emergency provisions in a constitution may allow decision-makers to override deadlines in the electoral laws or to enact emergency legislation. This does not suggest that term limits should not be protected in constitutional frameworks. However, the pandemic is creating extraordinary situations that constitutions, electoral laws and emergency powers legislation may not have contemplated. In some situations, such as the United States, any postponement will be legally or politically impossible, and focus must be instead on modifications to electoral processes and frameworks (discussed below) to protect public health as elections move forward. The Silence of the Laws Lacunae in legal frameworks present new challenges as electoral processes and emergency powers collide. Occasionally, the constitutional or legal framework in a specific country may provide for continuity of government beyond a mandated term, but in many other cases it is silent. In Myanmar, the Constitution explicitly provides that “after the expiry of the incumbent term, the President and the Vice-Presidents,” who are elected indirectly, “shall continue their duties until the time the new President is duly elected,”25 but no similar provision exists for members of Parliament (MPs). Hence, if elections are postponed beyond the end of a legally mandated term of office, questions may arise as to the legitimacy of office holders, even if a state of emergency is in place. Any decision to postpone would be significant, as Myanmar is facing a major general election this year — the second since a civilian government came to power in the 2015 democratic transitional elections. The timing of elections in Myanmar is determined by the Constitution and election laws, and there are three relevant sets of provisions in the 2008 Constitution. Taken together, these provisions require that – if there is to be no legislative interregnum, which would be constitutionally problematic – the election be held no later than January 2021.26 In North Macedonia, the Constitution provides that the mandates of the judges of the Constitutional Court, the president, the government and members of the Republican Judicial Council are extended for the duration of the state of war or state of emergency.27 However, the provision is silent about the current unprecedented situation where a state of emergency has been declared, but a dissolution of Parliament has already occurred. Hence, no legal norms clearly regulate whether Parliament can convene; if Parliament convenes, whether MPs would have a mandate until new MPs are elected, and whether their powers would be the same; whether Parliament reconvening would impact existing executive decrees promulgated during the state of emergency; and whether the speaker can amend the decision to call elections. Where emergency measures conflict with constitutional deadlines for elections, or if there is silence as to how these legal provisions interact, this can result in pressure to move ahead with an election, or to risk a real or perceived constitutional crisis. In the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, forthcoming general elections are highly anticipated and heavily contested in light of an independence referendum held at the end of 2019. The Constitution requires general elections to be held every five years,28 but International Foundation for Electoral Systems -9-