for fundamental rights affected by the suspension, both regions subsequently cancelled the electoral process, requiring the electoral process to restart.34 The decision was also based on the fact that the national emergency order afforded no certainty on when it would be possible to vote, hence the orders to cancel did not establish an alternative date. The national order has since been amended, delinking the electoral process with the state of emergency, and elections have now been scheduled for July 12, 2020. In Kyrgyzstan, local elections for certain regions had been set for April 12, 2020, but on March 21 the government introduced an “emergency situation regime” throughout Kyrgyzstan. On March 24, the president signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in select cities and territories that as a result postponed elections in those areas.35 Because the election process was already under way, the decree provided that candidates who had resigned from official positions were eligible to run for office and could resume those positions in the interim, until a new timeline for elections could be established. While these measures may have been “proportional” to the emergency situation by targeting key risk areas, it is not a stretch to see that in certain national elections, select postponements or cancellations in key opposition-stronghold areas could be a way of manipulating the overall result. In North Macedonia, Parliament was dissolved in February as the electoral process commenced, and a caretaker government was established as part of a political agreement to raise trust in the April 12, 2020 national elections.36 However, on March 18, the president declared a state of emergency and the caretaker government subsequently issued a decree ceasing all election-related activities during the state of emergency.37 This presents a complex scenario whereby a postponement is taking place during an electoral process and with a caretaker government in place — raising questions both of timing and of decision-making authority. The state of emergency is governed by the Constitution38 and the Law on the Government,39 but the Election Code is silent on what to do during a state of emergency. Hence, North Macedonia is in the midst of an electoral process, but the situation it now faces is largely unregulated. Delaying Democracy: Who Decides? The responsibility for making potentially difficult legal and operational decisions regarding the postponement of elections varies between countries and can become fraught, especially where the legal basis for postponement is not clear-cut. In terms of setting the date of an election, in some countries the EMB is mandated with setting the date of the election within the bounds of constitutional deadlines (for example, Ethiopia); in some, it rests with the executive (New Zealand); and in others, it is set in law (the United States). However, while the legal authority for setting an election date may sit with a certain body, the authority for postponing an election may reside elsewhere. In the New Zealand example outlined above, the executive sets the date of the election within legislative deadlines, but only a supermajority in the legislature could postpone it beyond those deadlines. Even if a particular body has the authority to decide on a postponement, consultation and communication will be important. In Canada, the Acho Dene Koe First Nation, an indigenous tribe, has a customary elections code, meaning the election procedures are set for and by its membership, but there is nothing in the code that deals with a postponement or rescheduling of an election.40 In postponing the election until November 2020, the chief and council said their consultations considered the following: the current state of emergency; the difficulty finding a venue that would respect the public health order and allow the right number of people to count ballots; and the fact that Indigenous Services Canada International Foundation for Electoral Systems -11-