20
SITAROPOULOS AND GIAKOUMOPOULOS v. GREECE JUDGMENT
C. The Court’s assessment
1. General principles
63. The Court reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 enshrines a
characteristic principle of an effective political democracy and is
accordingly of prime importance in the Convention system (see MathieuMohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 47, Series A no. 113). This
Article would appear at first to differ from the other provisions of the
Convention and its Protocols, as it is phrased in terms of the obligation of
the High Contracting Parties to hold elections under conditions which will
ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people rather than in terms
of a particular right or freedom. However, having regard to the travaux
préparatoires of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and the interpretation of the
provision in the context of the Convention as a whole, the Court has held
that it also implies individual rights, including the right to vote and the right
to stand for election (ibid., § 51). It has also held that the standards to be
applied for establishing compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 must be
considered to be less stringent than those applied under Articles 8 to 11 of
the Convention (see Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 115, ECHR
2006-IV).
64. The concept of “implied limitations” under Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1 is of major importance for the determination of the relevance of the
aims pursued by the restrictions on the rights guaranteed by this provision
(see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52). Given that Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 is not limited by a specific list of “legitimate aims” such as
those enumerated in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, the Contracting
States are free to rely on an aim not contained in such a list to justify a
restriction, provided that the compatibility of that aim with the principle of
the rule of law and the general objectives of the Convention is proved in the
particular circumstances of a case (see Ždanoka, cited above). Nevertheless,
it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with; it has to satisfy itself
that the conditions to which the right to vote and the right to stand for
election are made subject do not curtail the rights in question to such an
extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their
effectiveness; that they meet the requirements of lawfulness; that they are
imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not
disproportionate (see Tănase v. Moldova [GC], no. 7/08, § 162, ECHR
2010, and Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 52).
65. As regards, in particular, the choice of electoral system, the Court
reiterates that the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in
this sphere. In that regard, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 goes no further than
prescribing “free” elections held at “reasonable intervals”, “by secret ballot”
and “under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion