a. The evidence strongly suggests that there was a targeted program of voter suppression in place in the subject ridings. Based on the survey samples, it appears that tens of thousands of voters were targeted. b. These activities were clearly targeted at non-CPC voters in a manner that is highly improbable to have happened by chance. They included false reports of polling station changes and faux calls claiming to be from Elections Canada. In fact, Elections Canada made no such calls and there were virtually no voting station changes, yet many thousands of voters in the six ridings claim to have received these calls. c. Exposure to these calls clearly had a dampening effect on propensity for non-CPC supporters to vote. EKOS estimated the effect in the range of 1.0%. Applying a margin of error to those estimates would produce a band of 0.8% to 1.8%. In other words if these actions had not been in place, the CPC advantage would have been reduced by this amount on average in these six ridings. [209] The report found that residents of the subject ridings were significantly more likely to have received a call informing them of polling station change than those in the comparison ridings. Mr. Graves concluded that in the subject ridings voter suppression activities took place that were targeted at non-CPC voters. He found that the response rates for CPC voters were the same in both comparison and subject ridings. [210] These findings, the applicants submit, are consistent with the evidence of Mr. Langhorne that RMG, at the direction of the CPC, called hundreds of thousands of electors and read a message stating that: "Elections Canada has changed some voting locations at the last minute". This included calls to electors in five of the six subject ridings. The information was factually wrong in that there had been only one polling station change in all of the six subject ridings in which RMG made such calls. While GOTV calls were made by the other parties to their supporters, there is no suggestion that they included similar misleading information about polling station locations. 2013 FC 525 (CanLII) Page: 75

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