cannot exercise political rights through effectively
participating as voters or candidates due to
violence.30 Would it then be justifiable to impose the
harshest of penalties? The Code does not, however,
envision barring a candidate from participating
in the ongoing election in the first instance.31 The
IEBC barred an independent candidate, Neto
Adhola, from contesting elections on account of
failure to pay the fine imposed within 48 hours.32
The candidate had violated the Code by using the
colours of a political party.
A considerable section of the political class has
abundant resources to spend, making monetary
penalties ineffective. There are no available data
on politicians’ 2017 campaign expenditure, save for
the contribution and expenditure limits set by the
IEBC in August 2016 under the Election Campaign
Financing Act 2013. These limits resulted from
research, experiences of Kenya, and consultations
with stakeholders, among them elected leaders,
on their 2013 expenditure. For instance, the
expenditure limit for a Presidential candidate
was set at Kenyan Shillings 5,247,588,207.74
(approximately $52,475,882), a County Ward
Representative candidate in Fafi Ward (Garissa
County) was set at Kenyan Shillings 68,884.07
(approximately $688, while in Imara Daima Ward
(Nairobi County) the limit was set at Kenya Shillings
9,745,184.69 (approximately $97,451.84).33 The limits
were never operationalised, but they offer insight
into the finances of some individuals in the political
class.34 A discussion on regulating campaign
expenditure in elections is captured later in the
chapter under the subject of campaign financing.
It should be noted that a remedy is effective only
when it is practical. An EDR body that makes
orders deviating from this principle risks not only
being a poor arbiter but also a contributor towards
limiting the expression of popular will. Although
it is a tough and memorable sanction to bar a
political party or a candidate that breaches the
30
31
32
33
34
35
28
Code from contesting elections, this could have
negative consequences. These may include the
affected party or candidate instigating violence;
in this case, EDR would have failed to prevent
violence. The Code cannot be used as a tool to
whip political parties into shape if they had been,
before the election period, allowed not to comply
with electoral law provisions. What would be the
effect of barring a political party with a relatively
huge base of members and supporters? Would the
opposing political party have legitimacy if it wins
such an election? What would be the effect of such
a penalty on the voters who support the barred
political party or candidate? Be that as it may, the
law does not exist as a source of livelihood for the
legislature, to keep Parliament busy, it must have
force. In the same vein, EDR requires pragmatism;
this is a strong argument for using intermediate
sanctions before resorting to the harsh ones.
Although there is a Code and Rules of Procedure,
the ECCEC has sweeping discretion on what
penalties to mete out. There is no guidance on
which sanctions would apply to particular violations,
resulting in a lack of clarity and certainty. Although
the Second Schedule to the Elections Act under
paragraph 7(2) provides guidance on when one
could be barred from contesting elections, one of
the questions is whether the gravity of an offence
should warrant being barred from contesting
elections. The nature and repercussions of such a
penalty demands certainty in terms of the offences.
The penalty should be applied, if merited.
The requirement for ECCEC to comprise five
members is strenuous for the IEBC and its
performance, given the demands of an election
period on an EMB. The composition of ECCEC
is, however, linked to a time when the IEBC
consisted of the Chairperson and eight other
members, as opposed to the current composition
of a Chairperson and six other members.35 The
2017 and 2018 developments that saw four
Yolande B & Others ‘Women’s political inclusion in Kenya’s devolved political system, Journal of Eastern African Studies’(2019) https://www.researchgate.net/deref/
https%3A%2F%2Fdoi.org%2F10.1080%2F17531055.2019.1592294 (accessed 26 February 2021).
Elections Act 24 of 2011 Second Schedule para 7(b).
As above.
See http://kenyalaw.org/kenya_gazette/gazette/volume/MTQwMg--/Vol.CXVIII-No.%2090/ (accessed 1 April 2020).
The limits are meant to curb huge spending and provide an equal playing field. The Orange Democratic Movement while commenting on the limits termed them to be high,
however, they were a ceiling. The political class has not publicly and genuinely provided clarity on their expenditure.
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act 9 of 2011 sec 5.
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