instances been controversial, such as the situation in Uganda, where the Buganda Chiefdom stood out as collaborators and were used as the centre for spreading colonial rule. The colonialists, however, faced challenges in Bunyoro Kingdom, where the king was exiled for not complying with the colonisers’ demands.18 In extreme cases, such as in colonial South Africa and Mozambique, legitimate indigenous leaders were replaced with “puppet” leaders or parallel structures to undermine their authority and quell dissenting voices to colonial rule.19 In the post-independence era, literature also portrays traditional leadership as an avenue through which ruling parties consolidate power. As a respected institution that is closer to the people, ruling elites rely on traditional leaders to make subjects toe their partisan political lines. Chigwata notes how the ZANU PF party galvanised support from traditional leadership to deal with the rising force of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in rural areas since 2000.20 Through performing varied roles that included mobilisation of party supporters and intimidating dissenting voices, the institution of traditional leadership has remained a politicised entity.21 Although all political parties are interested in working with traditional leaders, ruling parties are often the ones who control this institution. In the case of Zimbabwe, chiefs are controlled through the Minister of Local Government, who oversees their appointment and removal and sets their conditions of service in terms of section 50 of the Traditional Leaders Act Chapter 29:17]. Indeed, traditional leaders are more likely to trade the votes of their subjects with incumbent elites, who have greater access to resources than opposition parties.22 In Zimbabwe, the state’s influence on traditional leaders also stems from the fact that the President appoints traditional leaders in accordance with the relevant and prevailing traditional culture, norms and practices.23 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 10 In appointing traditional leaders, the President consults with the relevant Minister responsible for traditional affairs and the District Administrator.24 This appointment criterion leaves room for the President as the appointing authority and his party to manipulate and control traditional leaders.25 Usually, the Ministry of Local Government, responsible for the administration of traditional leaders, is superintended by senior ZANU PF officials, such as Ignatius Chombo (2000 to 2015), Saviour Kasukuwere (2015 to 2017) and currently, July Moyo, who assumed office in November 2017. This is to ensure that the institution of traditional leaders is perpetually captured by the ruling party for partisan political benefits. Mindful of the influence and important role of traditional leaders in societal development, the ruling party in Zimbabwe has also used state resources and power to shower benefits to this institution. In the heat of political competition, traditional leaders have received motor vehicles, fuel subsidies, household electrification and other improvements of their homes, and allowances and salaries, which are usually reviewed during the period toward elections or where key political activities or processes are taking place. This is confirmed in that chiefs were given 226 vehicles, worth $6 million, in October 2017, which was announced by the then Local Government Minister Saviour Kasukuwere ahead of the National Council of Chiefs Conference, which was to be attended by the then President of Zimbabwe R.G. Mugabe. At that time, the ruling party was facing internal turbulences, and it is believed that Mugabe wanted to buy the loyalty of the chiefs. The vehicles came with a raise in the allowance of chiefs. This was 226 vehicles worth $6m P Mutibwa Uganda Since Independence: A story of unfulfilled hopes? (1992). EG Marsh, ED Roper & DA Kotze ‘Local government in Rhodesia’ in WB Vosloo, DA Kotzee & WJO Jeppe (eds Local government in Southern Africa (1974) 184. Marsh, Roper & Kotze (n 15), 287. ZESN (n 18) 2; European Union (EU) (n 5) 2; Mwonzora & Mandikwaza (n 3) 1145. M Slovik ‘Don’t Back No Losers! The Supply of Political Labor and the Political Organization of Clientelism’ unpublished manuscript, 2014. Sec 283 (i) Constitution of Zimbabwe 24. As above. C Keulder Traditional leaders and local government in Africa: Lessons from South Africa (1998) 142; J Makumbe ‘Local government institutions and elections’ in J de Visser, N Steytler & N Machingauta (eds) Local government reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (2010) 87; Chigwata (n 3 above) 243.