of the courts in the electoral processes cannot be
dismissed. Despite this, states must consider other
complementary systems for dispute resolution
before the conventional court contest. During the
coalition government in Zimbabwe between 2009
and 2013, the Global Political Agreement (GPA)
created a meta-mediation mechanism called the
Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
(JOMIC), composed of various political parties that
were party to the agreement. The mechanism was
in a way an extra-judicial conflict transformation
mechanism to help resolve disputes related to
political violence before they reach the courts.
It has been suggested that, ideally, the courts
should mitigate against the risk of electoral violence
by providing a dispute resolution mechanism
through which aggrieved political contenders can
seek redress.6 This should include alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms and mediation
platforms that operate with the force of law. The
advantages of ADR approaches as part of the judicial
and quasi-judicial approach to conflict transformation
are that they are less expensive, are judicially
sanctioned and are more conciliatory in approach.
This approach is relatively new, although various
aspects of it have been implemented in different
countries. In 2014, South Africa introduced CourtAnnexed Mediation as part of efforts to enhance
access to justice. Principles like those used in
these mediation methods can be used to design
a comprehensive platform to ensure that in the
pre-election environment there is a solid dispute
management process. This was attempted
in a different way by the National Peace and
Reconciliation Commission in Zimbabwe ahead of
the 2018 elections. The Commission established a
multi-party dialogue platform, and political parties
were required to sign a Code of Conduct.
The problem with such platforms, however, is
always the question of power balance and trust
in the mechanism. A trusted and independent
6
7
8
judiciary can help guarantee the process and
firewall the mechanisms against capture by the
dominant actors. This, of course, requires that
the judiciary, which provides the platform for
such interventions, is trusted by the parties and
has the credibility to ensure that decisions and
agreements from the platforms can be enforced at
law. However, if other parties have no faith in the
judiciary, the whole process remains fragile.
ENSURING POPULAR FREE PARTICIPATION
The popular saying goes, “Democracy is not rule
by the majority. Rather it is rule by the majority who
vote.” This is true in many “so-called democracies,”
where the question of who governs is answered by
the minority. Millions of people may, for instance,
for one reason or the other, not take part in
elections. This happens not because of a single
event, but a culture that is shaped by several factors
over time. It can be a culture of fear, exclusion, or
disempowerment. It takes root mainly from seemingly
harmless decisions and choices made over time.
In identifying the five major challenges to
electoral integrity, the Global Commission on
Elections, Democracy and Security, says one
of the challenges is removing barriers — legal,
administrative, political, economic, and social —
to universal and equal political participation.7
In Electoral Commission of South Africa v Speaker
of the National Assembly and Others,8 the court
spoke of the fundamental issue of participation:
Behind the complexities of precedent and the
intricate statutory machinery, lies a question of
importance for every South African. How can
this Court best ensure that the 2019 elections
fulfil the promises the Bill of Rights makes about
the franchise? These are, first, that every citizen
is “free to make political choices,” and second,
that every citizen “has the right to free, fair and
regular elections.”
SM Burchard & M Simati ‘The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria’ (2019) 38 Cadernos de Estudos Africanos [Online]. <https://journals.openedition.org/cea/
pdf/4407> pp123-144.
Annan et al (n 1).
Electoral Commission of South Africa v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2019 (3) BCLR 289 (CC).
51
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