7/17/2020 CACV73/2020 JUNIOR POLICE OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION OF THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE AND ANOTHER v. ELECTORAL … 49. In our view, although we would agree with the Judge in holding that the answer to doxxing could not be the abolition of public access to the electoral registers, we do not regard this holding as sufficient to resolve the Constitutional Challenge. Whilst the present challenge was brought against the background of doxxing campaigns targeted against police officers and their family members, involving extensive leakage of personal information and cyber-bullying on the Internet and various social and other media, which sprang up in the aftermath of the now withdrawn Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, it is not particularly helpful in considering the Constitutional Challenge to focus too much on the causal link between the publication of the registers and doxxing in assessing the validity of the challenge. 50. Before us, Mr Chan submitted that the Constitutional Challenge was a systemic one and that doxxing was not the only way in which the Linked Information could be misused. Thus at paragraphs 25 and 41 of the Amended Form 86, it was pleaded as follows: “25. The challenge against s.20(3) of the Regulation and s.38(1) of Cap 541F is non-fact specific and systemic insofar as: (1) s.20(3) of the Regulation makes it mandatory for the ERO in every election and regardless of the circumstances to make a copy of Final Register containing the Linked Information available for public inspection without giving the ERO the power to consider in the circumstances of each case whether the disclosure is warranted; and (2) s.38(1) of Cap 541F makes it mandatory for the CEO to supply to each candidate contents of the Final Register containing the Linked Information without giving the ERO the power to consider in the circumstances of each case whether the disclosure is warranted. Accordingly, the 1st and 4th Decisions by the EAC and the CEO to make and apply these provisions are also unlawful. … 41. The availability of registers containing the Linked Information under the present regime facilitate political acts such as doxxing (or other forms of harmful action) towards Police Officers or indeed any politically exposed electors whose names and home addresses are made accessible. The threat posed to the exercise of the BL 26 right is real and substantial. The problem is particularly significant from the perspective of voters’ rights and overall electoral integrity in that, the more heated and conflict-ridden the political and electoral climate, the greater the risk of misuse of the Linked Information and in turn the adverse impact on voters and the electoral process.” https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=128057&QS=%2B&TP=JU&ILAN=en 16/39