Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 15 Opinion of the Court IV We are asked to decide whether the Elections Clause carves out an exception to this basic principle. We hold that it does not. The Elections Clause does not insulate state legislatures from the ordinary exercise of state judicial review. A We first considered the interplay between state constitutional provisions and a state legislature’s exercise of authority under the Elections Clause in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565 (1916). There, we examined the application to the Elections Clause of a provision of the Ohio Constitution permitting the State’s voters “to approve or disapprove by popular vote any law enacted by the General Assembly.” Id., at 566. In 1915, the Ohio General Assembly drew new congressional districts, which the State’s voters then rejected through such a popular referendum. Asked to disregard the referendum, the Ohio Supreme Court refused, explaining that the Elections Clause—while “conferring the power therein defined upon the various state legislatures”—did not preclude subjecting legislative Acts under the Clause to “a popular vote.” State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 94 Ohio St. 154, 163, 114 N. E. 55, 58 (1916). We unanimously affirmed, rejecting as “plainly without substance” the contention that “to include the referendum within state legislative power for the purpose of apportionment is repugnant to §4 of Article I [the Elections Clause].” Hildebrant, 241 U. S., at 569; see also Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221, 230–231 (1920) (describing Hildebrant as holding that “the referendum provision of the state constitution when applied to a law redistricting the State with a view to representation in Congress was not unconstitutional”). Smiley v. Holm, decided 16 years after Hildebrant, considered the effect of a Governor’s veto of a state redistricting