Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 KAVANAUGH, J., concurring only to state court interpretations of state statutes, but also to state court interpretations of state constitutions. And in reviewing state court interpretations of state law, “we necessarily must examine the law of the State as it existed prior to the action of the [state] court.” Bush, 531 U. S., at 114 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). Petitioners here, however, have disclaimed any argument that the North Carolina Supreme Court misinterpreted the North Carolina Constitution or other state law. See ante, at 29.2 For now, therefore, this Court need not, and ultimately does not, adopt any specific standard for our review of a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause. See ante, at 28 (“We do not adopt these or any other test by which we can measure state court interpretations of state law in cases implicating the Elections Clause”). Instead, the Court today says simply that “state courts do not have free rein” and “hold[s] only that state courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review.” Ante, at 26, 29. In other words, the Court has recognized and articulated a general principle for federal court review of state court decisions in federal election cases. In the future, the Court should and presumably will distill that general principle into a more specific standard such as the one advanced by Chief Justice Rehnquist. With those additional comments, I agree with the Court’s conclusions that (i) state laws governing federal elections are subject to ordinary state court review, and (ii) a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause is in turn subject to federal court review. —————— 2 Instead, petitioners make the broader argument, which the Court today properly rejects, that the Elections Clause bars state courts from reviewing state laws for compliance with the relevant state constitution.