Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 3 Syllabus neither altered Harper I’s analysis of the federal issue nor negated the effect of the Harper I judgment striking down the 2021 plans, that issue both has survived and requires decision by this Court. Pp. 6–11. 2. The Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, famously proclaimed this Court’s authority to invalidate laws that violate the Federal Constitution. But Marbury did not invent the concept of judicial review. State courts had already begun to impose restraints on state legislatures, even before the Constitutional Convention, and the practice continued to mature during the founding era. James Madison extolled judicial review as one of the key virtues of a constitutional system, and the concept of judicial review was so entrenched by the time the Court decided Marbury that Chief Justice Marshall referred to it as one of society’s “fundamental principles.” Id., at 177.. The Elections Clause does not carve out an exception to that fundamental principle. When state legislatures prescribe the rules concerning federal elections, they remain subject to the ordinary exercise of state judicial review. Pp. 11–26. (a) In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565, this Court examined the Elections Clause’s application to a provision of the Ohio Constitution permitting the State’s voters to reject, by popular vote, any law enacted by the State’s General Assembly. This Court upheld the Ohio Supreme Court’s determination that the Federal Elections Clause did not preclude subjecting legislative acts under the Clause to a popular referendum, rejecting the contention that “to include the referendum within state legislative power for the purpose of apportionment is repugnant to §4 of Article I [the Elections Clause].” Id., at 569. And in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, this Court considered the effect of a Governor’s veto, pursuant to his authority under the State’s Constitution, of a congressional redistricting plan. This Court held that the Governor’s veto did not violate the Elections Clause, reasoning that a state legislature’s “exercise of . . . authority” under the Elections Clause “must be in accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.” Id., at 367. The Court highlighted that the Federal Constitution contained no “provision of an attempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be enacted.��� Id., at 368. This Court recently reinforced the teachings of Hildebrant and Smiley in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, a case concerning the constitutionality of an Arizona ballot initiative to amend the State Constitution and to vest redistricting authority in an independent commission. Significantly