MADLANGA J It may be overly restrictive to the free spirited. It may be censoring to those who are loath to be straight-jacketed by predetermined party positions. In a sense, it just may – at times – detract from the element of self; the idea of a free self; one’s idea of freedom. We are here not concerned with idle or unmeritorious preferences that may not be worthy of constitutional protection. This brings me to the Lavigne threshold. La Forest J held: “Realistically, . . . the organisation of our society compels us to be associated with others in many activities and interests that justify state regulation of these associations. Thus I doubt that section 2(d) can entitle us to be free of all legal obligations that flow from membership in a family. And the same can be said of the workplace. In short, there are certain associations which are accepted because they are integral to the very structure of society. Given the complexity and expansive mandate of modern government, it seems clear that some degree of involuntary association beyond the very basic foundation of the nation state will be constitutionally acceptable, where such association is generated by the workings of society in pursuit of the common interest. However, as will be seen, state compulsion in these areas may require assessment against the nature of the underlying associational activity the state has chosen to regulate.”72 It is important to note that at this point the Court was dealing with whether there was a limitation of the right to freedom of association, not justification under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.73 Being coerced to form or join a political party is an issue that may fundamentally touch one’s inner core; a matter that goes to one’s conscience. And freedom of 72 Lavigne above n 27 at 321. 73 Section 1 is the Canadian equivalent of section 36 of the South African Constitution. 24