In accordance with the LEMP, Serbia is one single constituency. This fact has shaped the electoral administration, which is, for parliamentary elections, comprised of the REC and polling boards. The LEMP stipulates that the REC and polling boards enjoy operational autonomy and independence, and that they are accountable to the authorities that appoint them. The National Assembly appoints the REC, which in turn appoints polling boards, at the latest ten days before Election Day. The same piece of legislation requires polling boards to be comprised of a president and at least two members,19 with this core make-up extended to include one representative of each entity contesting the election. The REC could be said to have political accountability, as it reports to Parliament, where political considerations trump expertise. The selection of core and extended polling board members seems to show these bodies are also predominantly political in character. However, it is worth noting that polling boards are also tasked with scrutinizing the lawfulness of the electoral process. For polling boards to be able to exercise this oversight of elections (ensuring the lawfulness and secrecy of the ballot and determining the results of the voting at the polling station) requires them to be plural, so that, even though boards are political in nature, their extended memberships – which are plural in a political sense – benefits the oversight function. In that sense, polling boards have political accountability, but their members may be said to also possess professional accountability to some extent, as polling boards report to the REC, which is comprised of legal professionals20 and so should be expected to use professional reasoning in its deliberations. Even though the REC is partly a professional body on account of its composition, some authors have accurately observed that parliamentary practice in selecting this body’s core members has a decisive impact on its nature. Tried and tested ‘party cadres’21 are appointed to the Commission, and seasoned party officers are ‘delegated’ to serve on the REC as representatives of parties and groups contesting the election, making it primarily a political entity. Clearly, the political affiliation of REC members is at odds with the statutory provision whereby the The political affiliation of REC members is at odds with the Commission is envisaged as independent and statutory provision whereby the autonomous. If the way in which a body’s complement is Commission is envisaged as independent and autonomous. appointed does not ensure independence and autonomy, but, rather, perpetuates political influence, any declared impartiality remains a dead letter. Being packed with proven political appointees who serve relatively short terms in office (of four years), the REC certainly fits the description of an entity that is neither independent nor autonomous. Lastly, international standards call for an independent arbiter of electoral disputes to head the electoral Presidents and members of polling boards have substitutes. According to Article 33 of the LEMP, holding a law degree is a precondition for serving on the NEC. 21 Dejan Milenković, Organi nadležni za sprovođenje izbora – pojam i oblici izborne administracije (uprave) u Srbiji, Zbornik Izbori u domaćem i stranom pravu, Institut za uporedno pravo, Beograd, 2012, p. 193. 19 20 24