SHAW v. RENO WHITE, J., dissenting own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where . . there is no indication that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system." Id., at 154-155. Again, in White v. Regester, supra, the same criteria were used to uphold the District Court's finding that a redistricting plan was unconstitutional. The "historic and present condition" of the Mexican-American community, id., at 767, a status of cultural and economic marginality, id., at 768, as well as the legislature's unresponsiveness to the group's interests, id., at 768-769, justified the conclusion that MexicanAmericans were "'effectively removed from the political processes,"' and "invidiously excluded.., from effective participation in political life," id., at 769. Other decisions of this Court adhere to the same standards. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 624-626 (1982); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975) (requiring proof that "the group has been denied access to the political process equal to the access of other 2 groups"). I summed up my views on this matter in the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. [09 (1986).3 Because districting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics, and because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," id., at 132, 2It should be noted that §2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any State to impose specified devices or procedures that result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. Section 2 also provides that a violation of that prohibition "is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class . . . in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U. S. C. § 1973(b). 8 Although Davis involved political groups, the principles were expressly drawn from the Court's racial gerrymandering cases. See 478 U. S., at 131, n. 12 (plurality opinion).