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Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) WHITE, J., dissenting taker's concurrence appears to be premised on the notion that black citizens were being "fenc[ed] out" of municipal benefits. Id., at 349. Subsequent decisions of this Court have similarly interpreted Gomillion as turning on the unconstitutional effect of the legislation. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 385 (1968). In Gomillion, in short, the group that formed the majority at the state level purportedly set out to manipulate city boundaries in order to remove members of the minority, thereby denying them valuable municipal services. No analogous purpose or effect has been alleged in this case. The only other case invoked by the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra. Wright involved a challenge to a legislative plan that created four districts. In the 17th, 19th, and 20th Districts, whites constituted respectively 94.9%, 71.5%, and 72.5% of the population. 86.3% of the population in the 18th District was classified as nonwhite or Puerto Rican. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. The plaintiffs alleged that the plan was drawn with the intent to segregate voters on the basis of race, in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id., at 53-54. The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. See id., at 55, 58. I fail to see how a decision based on a failure to establish discriminatory intent can support the inference that it is unnecessary to prove discriminatory effect. Wright is relevant only to the extent that it illustrates a proposition with which I have no problem: that a complaint stating that a plan has carved out districts on the basis of race can, under certain circumstances, state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan

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Shaw v. Reno

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff may state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that a legislature, though race-neutral on its face, drew district boundaries so bizarrely irregular that they can only be understood as an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race — and whether such a racial gerrymander, even without proof of vote dilution, triggers strict scrutiny as a racial classification.

Alleged Acts: As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. The state's voting-age population was approximately 78% white, 20% Black, and 1% Native American. The Black population was relatively dispersed, constituting a majority in only 5 of the state's 100 counties, with the largest concentrations in the northern Coastal Plain region. The North Carolina General Assembly first enacted a reapportionment plan containing one majority-Black congressional district centered in that area. However, forty of North Carolina's 100 counties were covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, requiring federal preclearance. The U.S. Attorney General objected to the plan, concluding that it appeared to dilute minority voting strength in violation of Section 5. In response, the General Assembly enacted new legislation creating a second majority-Black district — District 12 — which stretched approximately 160 miles along Interstate 85 in a serpentine shape, sometimes no wider than the highway itself, connecting discrete Black communities from Durham to Gastonia. The resulting district boundaries were of "dramatically irregular shape." A group of white voters, led by Ruth O. Shaw, challenged the revised plan, alleging that it constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Procedural history: A three-judge district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate vote dilution or other cognizable injury.

Summary: Shaw v. Reno is a landmark constitutional law decision that created an entirely new cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause: the racial gerrymandering claim. The Court held that a plaintiff may challenge a redistricting plan by alleging that the legislature drew district boundaries so bizarrely irregular that they can only be understood as an effort to separate voters by race — even without alleging vote dilution. Such racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, requiring the state to show that its use of race was narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. The decision was grounded in the principle that the state's sorting of voters by race carries a stigmatizing harm that is constitutionally distinct from vote dilution: it reinforces racial stereotypes and sends the message that race defines political identity. Shaw spawned an extensive line of racial gerrymandering cases — including Miller v. Johnson (1995), which shifted the focus from bizarre shape to whether race was the "predominant factor," and Bush v. Vera (1996) — and established the legal framework that continues to govern racial gerrymandering challenges today, including in cases like Cooper v. Harris (2017) and Allen v. Milligan (2023).

Conclusion: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable claim for racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court recognized a new cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause for racial gerrymandering — distinct from vote-dilution claims. The Court held that a plaintiff may state a claim by alleging that a reapportionment plan, though race-neutral on its face, is so "bizarre" or "irrational" in shape that it can only be understood as an effort to separate voters by race. The Court held that redistricting legislation that classifies voters on the basis of race is subject to strict scrutiny, the same standard applied to all racial classifications by the state. The state must show that its use of race is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Court emphasized the dramatically irregular shape of North Carolina's District 12 — a 160-mile serpentine corridor along Interstate 85 — as evidence that the legislature had used race as the predominant factor. The Court distinguished Shaw claims from ordinary political gerrymandering by the extreme irregularity of the district boundaries, which defied traditional districting principles. The Court held that the harm in a racial gerrymandering claim is not limited to the dilution of votes. The constitutional injury includes the stigmatizing effect of racial sorting by the state, which carries voters "the insidious message that their race defines their political identity" and reinforces "racial stereotypes and the perception that members of the same racial group think alike and share the same political interests.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 28, 1993

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep509/usrep509630/usrep509630.pdf

Primary Documents

Shaw v. Reno.pdf
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Election Judgments - IFES

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Shaw v. Reno

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