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Cite as: 509 U. S. 630 (1993) Opinion of the Court understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] ... voters" on the basis of race. Gomillion, supra, at 341. Gomillion, in which a tortured municipal boundary line was drawn to exclude black voters, was such a case. So, too, would be a case in which a State concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions. We emphasize that these criteria are important not because they are constitutionally required-they are not, cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S.735, 752, n. 18 (1973)-but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines. Cf. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 755 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("One need not use Justice Stewart's classic definition of obscenity-'I know it when I see it'-as an ultimate standard for judging the constitutionality of a gerrymander to recognize that dramatically irregular shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation" (footnotes omitted)). Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S.474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black ...violates the Equal Protection

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Shaw v. Reno

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff may state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that a legislature, though race-neutral on its face, drew district boundaries so bizarrely irregular that they can only be understood as an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race — and whether such a racial gerrymander, even without proof of vote dilution, triggers strict scrutiny as a racial classification.

Alleged Acts: As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. The state's voting-age population was approximately 78% white, 20% Black, and 1% Native American. The Black population was relatively dispersed, constituting a majority in only 5 of the state's 100 counties, with the largest concentrations in the northern Coastal Plain region. The North Carolina General Assembly first enacted a reapportionment plan containing one majority-Black congressional district centered in that area. However, forty of North Carolina's 100 counties were covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, requiring federal preclearance. The U.S. Attorney General objected to the plan, concluding that it appeared to dilute minority voting strength in violation of Section 5. In response, the General Assembly enacted new legislation creating a second majority-Black district — District 12 — which stretched approximately 160 miles along Interstate 85 in a serpentine shape, sometimes no wider than the highway itself, connecting discrete Black communities from Durham to Gastonia. The resulting district boundaries were of "dramatically irregular shape." A group of white voters, led by Ruth O. Shaw, challenged the revised plan, alleging that it constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Procedural history: A three-judge district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate vote dilution or other cognizable injury.

Summary: Shaw v. Reno is a landmark constitutional law decision that created an entirely new cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause: the racial gerrymandering claim. The Court held that a plaintiff may challenge a redistricting plan by alleging that the legislature drew district boundaries so bizarrely irregular that they can only be understood as an effort to separate voters by race — even without alleging vote dilution. Such racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, requiring the state to show that its use of race was narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. The decision was grounded in the principle that the state's sorting of voters by race carries a stigmatizing harm that is constitutionally distinct from vote dilution: it reinforces racial stereotypes and sends the message that race defines political identity. Shaw spawned an extensive line of racial gerrymandering cases — including Miller v. Johnson (1995), which shifted the focus from bizarre shape to whether race was the "predominant factor," and Bush v. Vera (1996) — and established the legal framework that continues to govern racial gerrymandering challenges today, including in cases like Cooper v. Harris (2017) and Allen v. Milligan (2023).

Conclusion: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable claim for racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court recognized a new cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause for racial gerrymandering — distinct from vote-dilution claims. The Court held that a plaintiff may state a claim by alleging that a reapportionment plan, though race-neutral on its face, is so "bizarre" or "irrational" in shape that it can only be understood as an effort to separate voters by race. The Court held that redistricting legislation that classifies voters on the basis of race is subject to strict scrutiny, the same standard applied to all racial classifications by the state. The state must show that its use of race is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Court emphasized the dramatically irregular shape of North Carolina's District 12 — a 160-mile serpentine corridor along Interstate 85 — as evidence that the legislature had used race as the predominant factor. The Court distinguished Shaw claims from ordinary political gerrymandering by the extreme irregularity of the district boundaries, which defied traditional districting principles. The Court held that the harm in a racial gerrymandering claim is not limited to the dilution of votes. The constitutional injury includes the stigmatizing effect of racial sorting by the state, which carries voters "the insidious message that their race defines their political identity" and reinforces "racial stereotypes and the perception that members of the same racial group think alike and share the same political interests.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 28, 1993

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep509/usrep509630/usrep509630.pdf

Primary Documents

Shaw v. Reno.pdf
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Election Judgments - IFES

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Shaw v. Reno

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