CAAMAÑO VALLE v. SPAIN JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION
B. The obligation to ensure the free expression of the opinion of the
people
12. Turning to the second aspect of the analysis under Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1, it is necessary to examine to what extent the restriction at
issue has a bearing on the “free expression of the opinion of the people”.
As is pointed out by the majority, any condition imposed on the
individual right to vote “must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to
maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at
identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage (see
paragraph 57 of the judgment, with references to the Court’s case-law).
The key notion in the text of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is that of “the
opinion of the people”. As I understand that notion, it refers to the opinion,
or the diversity of opinions, of the electorate as a whole. Article 3 requires
that the electoral system is organised in such a way that the result of the
election “fairly faithfully” reflects “the opinions of the people” (see
Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 54, Series A
no. 113; Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, § 112, ECHR
2008; and Cernea v. Romania, no. 43609/10, § 35, 27 February 2018).
The majority translate this requirement into one that concerns the
capability of each individual voter to “make a free and self-determined
electoral choice” (see paragraph 75 of the judgment). They thus reduce the
notion of “opinion of the people” to that of an aggregation of the individual
opinions of each voter. In doing so, they in fact return to the question of the
justification for the restriction of the individual voters’ right to exercise their
right to vote. This concerns the first aspect to be analysed under Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 (as discussed in paragraphs 3-11 above), and adds nothing to
it. The collective dimension of the “opinion of the people” is completely
lost.
13. What is required by respect for the “free expression of the opinion of
the people” is that the various groups in society, with their different views
on how society should be organised and how the benefits and the burdens
should be divided among the various categories of citizens, are fairly
represented in the body set up to represent “the people” and to take
important political decisions.
In this respect, I agree with the view of the Commissioner for Human
Rights, namely that excluding a large category of persons, such as persons
with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities, from the electoral process,
not only deprives these persons “of any possibility of influencing the
political process and the chance of shaping the policies and measures that
directly [affect] their lives”, but also deprives “society as a whole ... of a
legislature that [reflects] its full diversity” (see paragraph 47 of the
judgment).
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