CAAMAÑO VALLE v. SPAIN JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION An electoral system providing for the disenfranchisement of a whole category of vulnerable persons is hardly able to ensure “the free expression of the opinion of the people”. C. Conclusion 14. For the above reasons, I must conclude that there has been a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. II. ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 12 15. The majority conclude that there has been no violation of either Article 14 of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. They basically hold that the reasons which justified an interference with the right to vote as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, “are equally valid within the context of Article 14 [and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12]” (see paragraph 82 of the judgment). 16. I feel compelled to disagree on this point as well. In electoral matters, equality is of particular importance. By barring the applicant’s daughter from the exercise of her right to vote, the State reduced her to a second-class citizen. Unlike other citizens, she cannot make her voice heard, not even via a trusted person. I cannot see an objective and reasonable justification for the impugned difference in treatment. In my opinion, there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 17. This case is important not only for people with cognitive disabilities but also for the Court. How does it see its role as a guarantor of human rights? In Alajos Kiss, decided in 2010, the Court took a major step by holding that the automatic disenfranchisement of the applicant, merely because he was under partial guardianship, could not be considered to be within an acceptable margin of appreciation of the domestic authorities (see Alajos Kiss, cited above, § 42). It added that “the treatment as a single class of those with intellectual or mental disabilities is a questionable classification, and [that] the curtailment of their rights must be subject to strict scrutiny” (ibid., § 44). It nevertheless suggested that a removal of voting rights after “an individualised judicial evaluation, and solely based on a mental disability necessitating partial guardianship”, could be considered compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (ibid., § 44). In the present case the majority make that suggestion an explicit statement. 34