CAAMAÑO VALLE v. SPAIN JUDGMENT relations between the Contracting Parties (see, among many other authorities, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 67, ECHR 2008, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland [GC], no. 5809/08, § 134, 21 June 2016, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, § 123, 8 November 2016, and N.D. and N.T. v. Spain [GC], nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, § 172, 13 February 2020). 53. At the same time, the Court reiterates that it has authority to ensure that the text of the European Convention on Human Rights is respected (see Aliyeva and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 35587/08, § 74, 31 July 2014). It is the Convention which the Court can interpret and apply; it does not have authority to ensure respect for international treaties or obligations other than the Convention (see Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], no.36925/07, § 235, 29 January 2019). 54. The Court acknowledges that other instruments can offer wider protection than the Convention (regarding the CRPD, for example, see Rooman v. Belgium [GC], no. 18052/11, § 205, 31 January 2019), but the Court is not bound by interpretations given to similar instruments by other bodies, having regard to the possible difference in the contents of the provisions of other international instruments and/or the possible difference in role of the Court and the other bodies (see Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, § 113, 20 October 2016). The Court understands that the Convention should be interpreted, as far as possible, in harmony with other rules of international law. (b) Alleged violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (i) General principles 55. The Court has established that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see, inter alia, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 51, Series A no. 113, and Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, § 385 22 December 2020). However, the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for implied limitations, and the Contracting States have a margin of appreciation in this sphere, which generally is a wide one (see the abovecited cases of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, § 52, and Selahattin Demirtaş, § 387). The Court reiterates, however, that if a restriction on the right to vote applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society that has suffered considerable discrimination in the past, such as the mentally disabled, then the State’s margin of appreciation is substantially narrower (see Alajos Kiss, cited above, § 42). 56. It is for the Court to finally determine whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the limitations imposed on the exercise of the rights under Article 3 of 19

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