CAAMAÑO VALLE v. SPAIN JUDGMENT ... It should be stressed that section 3 of the LOREG does not deprive the ‘disabled’ of their right to vote as a group or on the basis of any disability. On the contrary, it gives the judicial authorities the task of deciding on such a restriction of the exercise of the fundamental right on an individual basis, because of the specific circumstances of each person and after due process has been observed. This provision does not stipulate the deprivation of this right of suffrage in its active aspect in respect of people suffering from any disability, but only to those in respect of whom it has been so decided, by a judgment, after the appropriate proceedings have been conducted with due respect to the guarantees of adequate defence and evidence, and by virtue of the specific dysfunctionality from which they suffer and which affects their intellectual and volitional capacity with respect to the exercise of the right to vote. Therefore, the restriction should only affect those persons who lack the minimum level of understanding and will necessary to freely exercise their vote, as provided by Article 23 § 1 of the Spanish Constitution. Furthermore, the nature of the measures referred to in Article 29 (a) (i) to (iii) of the CRPD is such ... that their purpose is to ensure the effective exercise of the right to vote as a true reflection of the free will of a person with a disability and not, on the contrary, the mere insertion of the ballot paper into the ballot box. 4. ... The case-law of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court ... requires that a decision not to allow someone to exercise his fundamental right to vote be preceded by an individualised examination of that person’s situation and by an assessment of the competing interests in play. ... ... It is necessary to point out that an assessment of the specific circumstances from which the contested decisions imply the inability to exercise the right to vote in the present case not only does not manifest any arbitrariness, irrationality, or obvious error in the wording of those decisions, but also complies with the principle of reinforced reasoning, which is required when a restriction of the exercise of fundamental rights is involved ... ... The contested judicial decisions take into consideration the data that they extract from the evidence – in particular from the forensic report and the examination carried out by the judge himself, as well as ... the statement given by the applicant’s daughter at the hearing – in order to reach a decision that cannot be categorised as unreasonable. As is clear from the judgments appealed against and as was explicit in the firstinstance judgment, the disputed decision does not depend on the person’s threshold of knowledge or instruction, which is not required for other citizens not subject to incapacity proceedings. The said knowledge is only one piece of information which, together with others – particularly medical-psychiatric expert reports – can be reasonably used to evaluate a person’s aptitude ... This can also be applied to the question of ‘influence exerted by third parties’ ... It is not ... a question of identifying an absence of knowledge ... on the part of a person lacking capacity, but of recognising that through these elements (among others) ... the degree of development of the mental faculties of the person in question can be ascertained.” 15. The Constitutional Court concluded that there had not been any violation of the fundamental rights alleged. 5