CAAMAÑO VALLE v. SPAIN JUDGMENT
situation as the applicant automatically benefitted from the provisions of the
new law.
(c) The third party’s submissions
46. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (“the
Commissioner”) considered that developments within the UN system and
the Council of Europe demonstrated a clear evolution in terms of the
clarification of international obligations and that there was a consensus
among the Contracting States within the context of commonly agreed
international standards to the effect that the withdrawal of political rights on
the basis of a disability (including cognitive impairment) and mental health
status was unacceptable, even when it stemmed from a judicial decision.
47. In the opinion of the Commissioner, when a large category of
persons – such as the nearly 100,000 persons in Spain with intellectual and
psychosocial disabilities – was excluded from the electoral process, not only
were they deprived of any possibility of influencing the political process
and the chance of shaping the policies and measures that directly affected
their lives, but society as a whole was deprived of a legislature that reflected
its full diversity. Therefore, such measures certainly interfered with the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the sense of Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1. They also perpetrated age-old stigmas against persons with
intellectual and psychosocial disabilities; such stigmas were damaging to
the whole of society. Voting was also an important symbol of empowerment
and inclusion and could affect the motivation of persons with disabilities to
participate in public life and contribute to the societies in which they lived.
48. In conclusion, the Commissioner was of the opinion that Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention should be interpreted in the light of
Article 29 of the CRPD and other international standards that provided that
the right to vote of persons with disabilities should be upheld without
exception. The Commissioner furthermore asserted that the practice of
depriving persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities of their
right to vote on the basis of a judicial decision could not be considered to be
compatible with a legitimate aim in a modern democracy and amounted to
discrimination; interfering with the ability of the persons concerned to freely
express their opinions had serious negative effects on those persons, on
society and on democracy. Accordingly, States should be reminded of their
positive obligations to ensure that persons with disabilities (including
intellectual and psychosocial disabilities) could effectively exercise their
right to vote; they could realise those obligations by undertaking general
measures securing the accessibility of electoral procedures, reasonable
accommodation, and the provision of individual support where necessary.
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