CAAMAÑO VALLE v. SPAIN JUDGMENT
relations between the Contracting Parties (see, among many other
authorities, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 67, ECHR
2008, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland [GC],
no. 5809/08, § 134, 21 June 2016, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary
[GC], no. 18030/11, § 123, 8 November 2016, and N.D. and N.T. v. Spain
[GC], nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, § 172, 13 February 2020).
53. At the same time, the Court reiterates that it has authority to ensure
that the text of the European Convention on Human Rights is respected (see
Aliyeva and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 35587/08, § 74, 31 July 2014). It is the
Convention which the Court can interpret and apply; it does not have
authority to ensure respect for international treaties or obligations other than
the Convention (see Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC],
no.36925/07, § 235, 29 January 2019).
54. The Court acknowledges that other instruments can offer wider
protection than the Convention (regarding the CRPD, for example, see
Rooman v. Belgium [GC], no. 18052/11, § 205, 31 January 2019), but the
Court is not bound by interpretations given to similar instruments by other
bodies, having regard to the possible difference in the contents of the
provisions of other international instruments and/or the possible difference
in role of the Court and the other bodies (see Muršić v. Croatia [GC],
no. 7334/13, § 113, 20 October 2016). The Court understands that the
Convention should be interpreted, as far as possible, in harmony with other
rules of international law.
(b) Alleged violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
(i) General principles
55. The Court has established that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees
individual rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election (see,
inter alia, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 51,
Series A no. 113, and Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC],
no. 14305/17, § 385 22 December 2020). However, the rights guaranteed
under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for
implied limitations, and the Contracting States have a margin of
appreciation in this sphere, which generally is a wide one (see the abovecited cases of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, § 52, and Selahattin Demirtaş,
§ 387). The Court reiterates, however, that if a restriction on the right to
vote applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society that has suffered
considerable discrimination in the past, such as the mentally disabled, then
the State’s margin of appreciation is substantially narrower (see Alajos Kiss,
cited above, § 42).
56. It is for the Court to finally determine whether the requirements of
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself
that the limitations imposed on the exercise of the rights under Article 3 of
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