CAAMAÑO VALLE v. SPAIN JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION
CRPD” Committee) to Articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities (hereafter “the CRPD”).
Article 12 § 2 provides that States Parties shall recognise that persons
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity, on an equal basis with others, in all
aspects of life. According to the CRPD Committee, “legal capacity includes
the capacity to be both a holder of rights and an actor under the law”
(General Comment No. 1 (2014) on Article 12: Equal recognition before the
law, § 12, CRPD/C/GC/1).
The CRPD Committee further notes that “recognition of legal capacity is
inextricably linked to the enjoyment of many other human rights provided
for in the [CRPD]” (ibid., § 31). With respect to Article 29, which
guarantees the right of persons with disabilities to “effectively and fully
participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others”
(Article 29 (a), the CRPD Committee is of the opinion “that a person’s
decision-making ability cannot be a justification for any exclusion of
persons with disabilities from exercising their political rights, including the
right to vote ...” (ibid., § 48, quoted in paragraph 24 of the judgment).
The statements referred to above should be read in conjunction with the
CRPD Committee’s views in Zsolt Bujdosó and Others v. Hungary, adopted
a year earlier (communication no. 4/2011, views adopted on 9 September
2013, CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011). That case was brought by a number of
persons suffering from intellectual disability and placed under partial or
general guardianship. They complained about their disenfranchisement on
the basis of disability. The CRPD Committee held that “an exclusion of the
right to vote on the basis of a perceived or actual psychosocial or
intellectual disability, including a restriction pursuant to an individualised
assessment, constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability”. A
provision “which allows courts to deprive persons with intellectual
disability of their right to vote ..., is in breach of Article 29 of the [CRPD]”
(ibid., § 9.4).
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is simple: under the CRPD,
all persons with disabilities, without exception, should have the right to
vote, and no one should be deprived of that right on the basis of any
perceived or actual intellectual disability.
5. The majority admit that the Convention should be interpreted, as far
as possible, in harmony with other rules of international law (see
paragraph 54 of the judgment). They underline, however, that the Court is
“not bound by interpretations given to similar instruments by other bodies”
(ibid.). I have no problem agreeing with that statement in general. It is for
the Court to decide for itself how a provision of the Convention is to be
interpreted, and it may conclude that the Convention provision is to receive
an interpretation that is different from another human-rights body’s
interpretation of a similar provision.
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