CAAMAÑO VALLE v. SPAIN JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION B. The obligation to ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people 12. Turning to the second aspect of the analysis under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, it is necessary to examine to what extent the restriction at issue has a bearing on the “free expression of the opinion of the people”. As is pointed out by the majority, any condition imposed on the individual right to vote “must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage (see paragraph 57 of the judgment, with references to the Court’s case-law). The key notion in the text of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is that of “the opinion of the people”. As I understand that notion, it refers to the opinion, or the diversity of opinions, of the electorate as a whole. Article 3 requires that the electoral system is organised in such a way that the result of the election “fairly faithfully” reflects “the opinions of the people” (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 2 March 1987, § 54, Series A no. 113; Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, § 112, ECHR 2008; and Cernea v. Romania, no. 43609/10, § 35, 27 February 2018). The majority translate this requirement into one that concerns the capability of each individual voter to “make a free and self-determined electoral choice” (see paragraph 75 of the judgment). They thus reduce the notion of “opinion of the people” to that of an aggregation of the individual opinions of each voter. In doing so, they in fact return to the question of the justification for the restriction of the individual voters’ right to exercise their right to vote. This concerns the first aspect to be analysed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (as discussed in paragraphs 3-11 above), and adds nothing to it. The collective dimension of the “opinion of the people” is completely lost. 13. What is required by respect for the “free expression of the opinion of the people” is that the various groups in society, with their different views on how society should be organised and how the benefits and the burdens should be divided among the various categories of citizens, are fairly represented in the body set up to represent “the people” and to take important political decisions. In this respect, I agree with the view of the Commissioner for Human Rights, namely that excluding a large category of persons, such as persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities, from the electoral process, not only deprives these persons “of any possibility of influencing the political process and the chance of shaping the policies and measures that directly [affect] their lives”, but also deprives “society as a whole ... of a legislature that [reflects] its full diversity” (see paragraph 47 of the judgment). 33

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