Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 11 THOMAS, J., concurring in part Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 643, 730–732 (2006)). A proportionality approach is easy to apply, but it is “radically inconsistent with the [Reconstruction] Amendments’ command that government treat citizens as individuals and their ‘goal of a political system in which race no longer matters.’ ” 599 U. S., at 82 (quoting Shaw, 509 U. S., at 657). I continue to believe that “[t]he matters the Court has set out to resolve in vote dilution cases are . . . not questions of law,” and that “they are not readily subjected to any judicially manageable standards.” Holder, 512 U. S., at 901– 902 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The Court’s determination to nonetheless adjudicate these cases has yielded an unconstitutional practice of distributing of political power based on race. B Racial gerrymandering and vote dilution claims—at a minimum, those challenging congressional districts—are nonjusticiable for an additional reason: The Elections Clause makes a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment” of the power to oversee congressional districting to “a coordinate political department,” Congress. Vieth, 541 U. S., at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, no other constitutional provision overcomes that commitment to Congress. The Constitution contemplates no role for the federal courts in the districting process. 1 Although States have the initial duty to draw district lines, the Elections Clause commits exclusive supervisory authority over the States’ drawing of congressional districts to Congress—not federal courts. It provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by