20 ALEXANDER v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP THOMAS, J., concurring in part intrusive potential of judicial intervention into the legislative realm.” Id., at 916. These concerns about intruding on the political process should have been a clear sign to retreat. Instead, the Court forged ahead to adopt a constitutionally suspect compromise. The racial predominance standard does not even purport to be consistent with the colorblind Constitution. The Miller Court simply borrowed that standard from the District Court’s flawed opinion below. The Court endorsed the District Court’s decision “to require strict scrutiny whenever race is the ‘overriding, predominant force’ in the redistricting process.” Id., at 909, 917 (quoting Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1372 (SD Ga. 1994)). But, the District Court’s opinion could not have been a stronger rejection of our colorblind Constitution. It acknowledged that the racial predominance standard allowed legislatures to “intentionally consider race in redistricting—and even alter the occasional line in keeping with that consideration—without incurring constitutional review.” Id., at 1373. But, the District Court reasoned, “[b]oth the Supreme Court and Congress have already admitted that the Constitution is not genuinely ‘color-blind.’ ” Id., at 1374. This provenance underscores the inconsistency of the racial predominance standard with our colorblind Constitution. Any use of race in drawing political districts—no matter how minor—must be justified by a compelling interest. The Court’s insistence on hearing nonjusticiable districting claims leads it to disregard that principle in favor of a distorted standard that legitimizes racial classifications. If the Court is truly concerned about intruding on the political process, it should acknowledge that districting is a political question and vacate the field. B The Court’s standard for vote dilution claims is similarly

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