16 ABBOTT v. PEREZ Opinion of the Court reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required.” Rules 65(d)(1)(B), (C); see Brief for Appellees in No. 17–586, at 27. But as explained in Gunn v. University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U. S. 383, 389, n. 4 (1970), we have never suggested that a failure to meet the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d) would “deprive the Court of jurisdiction under §1253.” A contrary holding would be perverse. Rule 65(b) protects the party against which an injunction is issued by requiring clear notice as to what that party must do or refrain from doing. Where a vague injunction does not comply with Rule 65(b), the aggrieved party has a particularly strong need for appellate review. It would be odd to hold that there can be no appeal in such a circumstance. For these reasons, we hold that we have jurisdiction under §1253 to hear an appeal from an order that has the same practical effect as one granting or denying an injunction. B With these principles settled, we conclude that the orders in these cases qualify as interlocutory injunctions under §1253. The text of the orders and the context in which they were issued make this clear. The orders are unequivocal that the current legislative plans “violate §2 and the Fourteenth Amendment” and that these violations “must be remedied.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 686; see also, e.g., 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 795 (“[V]iolations found by this Court in its Order on [the State House plan] now require a remedy”); ibid. (“In Bell County, the intentional discrimination previously found by the Court must be remedied”); ibid. (“In Dallas County, the intentional discrimination previously found by the Court must be remedied”). We do not suggest that this language alone is sufficient to show that the orders had the practical effect of enjoin-