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Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 Syllabus denying an injunction, it should be treated as such for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 83. Pp. 11–16. (b) The text of the orders and the context in which they were issued make clear that they qualify as interlocutory injunctions under §1253. The orders were unequivocal that the current legislative plans “violate §2 and the Fourteenth Amendment” and that these violations “must be remedied.” And the short time frame the attorney general was given to act is strong evidence that the court did not intend to allow the elections to go ahead under the plans it had just condemned. The unmistakable import of these actions is that the court intended to have new plans ready for use in this year’s elections. Texas also had reason to fear that if it tried to conduct elections under those plans, the court would infer an evil motive and perhaps subject the State to the strictures of preclearance under §3(c) of the VRA. These cases differ from Gunn v. University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U. S. 383, where the order did not have the same practical effect as an injunction. Nor does it matter that the remedy is not yet known. The issue here is whether this year’s elections can be held under the plans enacted by the Legislature, not whether any particular remedies should ultimately be ordered if it is determined that the current plans are flawed. Section 1253 must be strictly, but sensibly construed, and here the District Court’s orders, for all intents and purposes, constituted injunctions. Thus, §1253 provides jurisdiction. Pp. 16–21. 2. The Texas court erred in requiring the State to show that the 2013 Legislature purged the “taint” that the court attributed to the defunct and never-used plans enacted by a prior legislature in 2011. Pp. 21–32. (a) Whenever a challenger claims that a state law was enacted with discriminatory intent, the burden of proof lies with the challenger, not the State. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U. S. 471, 481. In redistricting cases, the “good faith of [the] state legislature must be presumed.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 915. The allocation of the burden of proof and the presumption of legislative good faith are not changed by a finding of past discrimination, which is but “one evidentiary source” relevant to the question of intent. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 267. Here, the 2011 plans were repealed, and not reenacted, by the 2013 Legislature. Nor did it use criteria that arguably carried forward the effects of the 2011 Legislature’s discriminatory intent. Instead, it enacted, with only small changes, the Texas court plans developed pursuant to this Court’s instructions. The Texas court contravened these basic burden of proof principles, referring,

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Abbott v. Perez

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether the 2013 Texas congressional and state House redistricting plans violated the Equal Protection Clause (racial gerrymandering), Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (vote dilution), and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (intentional discrimination) — and specifically whether the district court erred by finding that the 2011 discriminatory intent "carried over" into the 2013 plans enacted by the Legislature; holding that certain districts were racial gerrymanders where race was the predominant factor; finding Section 2 vote dilution in certain districts where plaintiffs could not demonstrate that an additional compact minority opportunity district was possible; and applying the wrong legal standard in distinguishing between racial motivation and partisan motivation in redistricting.

Alleged Acts: Following the 2010 census, the Texas Legislature enacted new congressional (Plan C185) and state House (Plan H283) redistricting plans. The plans were challenged by various plaintiffs — including individual voters, the Mexican American Legislative Caucus (MALC), the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the NAACP, and others — alleging racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause, vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and intentional discrimination. Texas was a covered jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and sought preclearance from a D.C. district court. While preclearance was pending, the W.D. Texas district court drew interim plans (Plan C220 for Congress and Plan H309 for the state House) for use in the 2012 elections. The Supreme Court in Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388 (2012), vacated the interim maps, directing the district court to be more deferential to the elected branches. The interim maps were then revised. After Shelby County v. Holder (2013) effectively ended Section 5 preclearance, the Texas Legislature adopted the court-drawn interim plans (with modifications) as its 2013 plans (Plan C235 for Congress and Plan H358 for the state House), enacting them into law. Plaintiffs challenged the 2013 plans as well, arguing that the 2011 discriminatory intent "carried over" into the 2013 plans because the Legislature adopted the interim maps as a "litigation strategy" to insulate the discriminatory plans from judicial review.

Procedural history: The district court conducted extensive proceedings over several years, issuing multiple opinions addressing racial gerrymandering, vote dilution, and intentional discrimination claims.

Summary: Abbott v. Perez was the culmination of a decade of redistricting litigation in Texas. The Supreme Court largely reversed the district court, upholding the 2013 Texas redistricting plans and rejecting most of the racial gerrymandering, vote dilution, and intentional discrimination claims. The Court's key holdings were: (1) the 2013 Legislature was entitled to a presumption of good faith, and the district court erred by treating the 2013 plans as a continuation of the 2011 plans without independently proving the 2013 Legislature's discriminatory intent; (2) the district court had erred in its racial gerrymandering analysis by conflating the use of race as a factor with the "predominant factor" standard under Miller v. Johnson, though the finding of racial gerrymandering in HD90 was upheld; (3) the Section 2 vote dilution claims failed because plaintiffs could not show that an additional reasonably compact minority opportunity district was possible; and (4) the district court had not properly distinguished between racial motivation and partisan motivation, particularly in a state where race and party are highly correlated. The decision reinforced the presumption of legislative good faith in redistricting, tightened the requirements for proving racial predominance, and confirmed that Section 2 vote dilution claims require proof that an additional compact minority district is possible — not merely that the existing configuration of districts is suboptimal.

Conclusion: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court on most claims and upheld the 2013 Texas redistricting plans. The Court rejected the district court's finding that the 2011 discriminatory intent "carried over" into the 2013 plans. The Court held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by treating the 2013 enactment as merely a continuation of the 2011 plans. The Court held that when a legislature enacts a new plan, there is a presumption of good faith and the plaintiffs must prove that the 2013 Legislature itself acted with discriminatory intent. The district court had held that the 2013 Legislature engaged in no "deliberative process" to remove discriminatory taint and "intended any such taint to be maintained but be safe from remedy." The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, holding that the 2013 Legislature's adoption of the court-drawn interim plans was legitimate and that the presumption of legislative good faith had not been overcome. The Court reversed the district court's racial gerrymandering findings for most challenged districts. The Court held that the district court had erred by conflating the use of race as a factor with the use of race as the "predominant" factor — the standard required to trigger strict scrutiny under Miller v. Johnson. The Court emphasized that the legislature "always is aware of race when it draws district lines," but the key question is whether race was used "for its own sake" rather than as one factor among many. The Court reversed the district court's Section 2 findings for CD27, HD32, and HD34, holding that plaintiffs had failed to establish a violation because they could not demonstrate that an additional reasonably compact Latino opportunity district was possible. The Court reversed the district court's "totality of the circumstances" analysis, holding that the district court had relied on flawed statistical evidence (specifically, the use of Spanish-surname voter registration data) and had incorrectly applied the Gingles preconditions. The Court emphasized that the first Gingles precondition requires the minority group to be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," and that the district court had not properly assessed whether an additional compact opportunity district was possible.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Voting Rights Act of 1965, Fourteenth Amendment, and Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 25, 2018

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-586_o7kq.pdf

Primary Documents

Abbott v. Perez.pdf
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Abbott v. Perez

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