11 and powers of the Commissioner." He later concluded: "I am satisfied that the Constitutional right to vote and the right to be elected to public office is adequately protected by the discretion granted to the Electoral Commissioner in the Organic Law and by the procedure to challenge an election in s 206." We adopt this reasoning process so far as the Constitutional right under s 50 and the discretion given to the Electoral Commission to deal with polling schedules are concerned. The s 50 rights are adequately protected by the discretion given to the Electoral Commission. The Respondent could have applied to the Electoral Commission to extend the polling schedule under s 115 or to the Head of State on advice under s 177 of the Organic Law. If s 155 (4) has any application, it may be applicable to a review of the exercise of discretion by the Electoral Commission under the Organic Law. This is not such an application. We do not suggest that this may be done in a case where the Electoral Commission has exercised discretion in respect of polling schedules. The point we make is that this provision does not give the National Court power to extend polling schedules. This is a general power to do justice within the context of inherent powers of the National and the Supreme Courts in making orders in the nature of prerogative writs. The nature of s 155 (4) was considered in Avia Aihi v The State [1981] PNGLR 81. In that case, the provision was considered within the context of s 27 of the Supreme Court Act which limits right to appeal within 40 days of conviction. Avia Aihi failed to appeal within the 40 days and the question was whether she could file her appeal outside the 40 days in the interest of "justice" under s 155 (4)? Chief Justice Kidu addressed this issue at page 87: "However as I understand Mr Wilson’s argument if it is held that s 37 (15) is regulated by s 27 of the Supreme Court Act and therefore the applicant cannot effectively bring her appeal against the sentence before the court, the court nevertheless has an overriding power under s 155 (4) of the Constitution to order that she be allowed to appeal out of time. What the Court has been asked to do is to make an order contrary to s 37 (15) and s 27 of the Supreme Court Act 1975. The terms of s 37 (15) and s 27 of the Act are quite clear and in my view this Court has no power under s 155 (4) of the Constitution to make an order contrary to specific dictates of the Constitution. If the contention is correct that this court can make an order under s 155 (4) of the Constitution then we would have the situation where the Supreme Court can override an Act of Parliament specifically allowed to be made by the Constitution. I would not think that the Founding Fathers of the Constitution intended this to be the case." Deputy Chief Justice Kearney at page 91 agreed with Chief Justice: "Accordingly, I respectfully agree with the Chief Justice that the Constitution, s 155 (4), does not vest in this Court power to waive a failure to comply with s 27 of the Act, I would reject the submission."