CRPD/C/10/D/4/2011 valid political opinion. According to that argument, individuals who are objectively found to lack the capacity to vote are by definition unable to vote competently. However, according to the interveners, the legitimacy of that aim is itself questionable, since it is not for the State to determine what constitutes a valid political opinion. While conceding that there are persons with disabilities who are unable to formulate a rational political opinion, the interveners stress that the inability to cast a “competent” or “rational” vote is by no means specific to persons with disabilities. Consequently, if there are both persons with disabilities and persons without disabilities who are unable to cast a competent vote, it cannot be maintained that only the former should be subject to assessment of their capacity. Long-entrenched prejudice against persons with disabilities is the only reason for the current practice, which must be rejected under the Convention. (b) Inevitable disenfranchisement of capable individuals 5.8 According to the interveners, capacity assessments are not a proportionate means of assessing competence in this context. Capacity assessments rest on the assumption that it is possible to objectively separate “incapable” voters from the rest. However, that assumption is not well-founded according to psychological experts. There is no scientifically determinable cut-off point between persons who have and those who lack the capacity to vote. Accordingly, incapacity assessments will always result in disenfranchisement of at least some capable voters with disabilities. 5.9 The interveners add that the goal of the State — to protect the integrity of the electoral system — is neither compelling, given that it targets only a small subset of the potentially incompetent voters (those who are labelled as having a disability), nor legitimate, since it is discriminatory. (c) Capacity assessment in practice 5.10 Additionally, the interveners stress that practice in many countries shows that if capacity assessment on the basis of disability is permitted, it will result in the disenfranchisement of a large number of persons with disabilities on the sole basis of their disability status. The interveners refer to the Committee’s concluding observations on Spain, in which it noted with concern “the number of persons with disabilities denied their right to vote”, and stated that “the deprivation of this right appears to be the rule and not the exception.”9 According to the interveners, the situation in the State party similarly infringes the rights of persons with disabilities: as of 1 January 2011, some 71,862 persons, constituting 0.9 per cent of the adult population of the State party, were excluded from the right to vote. However, only 1,394 persons are registered as having “severe or profound intellectual disabilities”, thus constituting the primary target and justification of the policy of exclusion.10 There is therefore a huge discrepancy between the number of people whose competence to vote could conceivably be questioned and the number who are currently disenfranchised. Moreover, the number of people who are disenfranchised is constantly increasing. Regardless of how these assessments will be changed by the Government of the State party in the future, it is a fair prediction that the number of disenfranchised persons 9 10 8 CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1, para. 47. According to the 2001 census, there were 38,841 adult persons with intellectual disability in Hungary: see the results of the census at http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/. Persons with severe and profound disabilities are estimated to constitute 3.5 per cent of all persons with intellectual disability: see Martha A. Field and Valerie A. Sanchez, Equal Treatment for People with Mental Retardation: Having and Raising Children, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, Harvard University Press, 1999.