ANATOLIY MARINOV v. BULGARIA JUDGMENT risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws that it promulgates. Exclusion of any groups or categories of the general population must accordingly be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see, among other authorities, Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 62, ECHR 2005-IX, and Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) [GC], no. 126/05, § 84, 22 May 2012). More specifically, election results should not be obtained through votes cast in a manner that runs counter to the fairness of elections or the free expression of the will of voters (see Caamaño Valle v. Spain, no. 43564/17, § 57, 11 May 2021). 48. The Court reiterates that the presumption in a democratic State must be in favour of the inclusion of all, and that universal suffrage is the basic principle (see Hirst (no. 2), cited above, § 59; Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece [GC], no. 42202/07, § 67, ECHR 2012; and Scoppola (no. 3), cited above, § 82). This does not mean, however, that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees to persons with a mental disability an absolute right to exercise their right to vote. Under this provision, such persons are not immune to limitations of their right to vote, provided that the limitations comply with the conditions set out in paragraphs 46-47 above. For the purpose of the interpretation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has recently noted the fact that there is at present no consensus among the States Parties to Protocol No. 1 in the sense of an unconditional right of persons with a mental disability to exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, a majority of these States seems to allow for restrictions based on the mental capacity of the individual concerned (see Caamaño Valle, cited above, § 59). 49. The margin of appreciation left to the States is not unlimited. The Court has already stated that an absolute bar on voting by any person under partial guardianship, irrespective of his or her actual faculties, does not fall within any acceptable margin of appreciation (see Alajos Kiss, cited above, § 42). Likewise, the indiscriminate removal of voting rights, without an individualised judicial evaluation and solely on the basis of a mental disability necessitating partial guardianship, cannot be considered compatible with the legitimate grounds for restricting the right to vote (ibid., § 44). 50. By contrast, the Court has accepted as legitimate the aim of “ensuring that only citizens capable of assessing the consequences of their decisions and of making conscious and judicious decisions should participate in public affairs” (ibid., § 38). (b) Application of the general principles to the present case 51. In the present case, the applicant was placed under partial guardianship owing to his suffering from psychiatric disorders. As a consequence, he was disenfranchised and prevented from voting in parliamentary elections. His right to vote was thus restricted by law, which was not disputed by the parties. The Court will proceed to determine whether 12