ANATOLIY MARINOV v. BULGARIA JUDGMENT 44. However, the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute. There is room for implied limitations, and the Contracting States have a margin of appreciation in this sphere, which generally is a wide one (see the above-cited cases of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, § 52, and Selahattin Demirtaş, § 387). At the same time, the Court reiterates that if a restriction on the right to vote applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society that has suffered considerable discrimination, such as the mentally disabled, then the margin of appreciation of the State in question is substantially narrower. The reason for this approach, which questions certain classifications per se, is that such groups have been historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion. Such prejudice may entail legislative stereotyping that prohibits the individualised evaluation of their capacities and needs (see Alajos Kiss, cited above, § 42). The Court emphasises, in that respect, that the quality of the parliamentary and judicial review of the necessity of a general measure, such as the disputed disenfranchisement imposed as a consequence of declaring a person legally incapable, is of particular importance, including to the operation of the relevant margin of appreciation (see Strøbye and Rosenlind v. Denmark, nos. 25802/18 and 27338/18, § 92, 2 February 2021). 45. Another factor that has had an impact on the scope of States’ margin of appreciation is the Court’s fundamentally subsidiary role in the Convention protection system. The Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, and in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court. Through their democratic legitimation, the national authorities are, as the Court has held on many occasions, in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions (see, inter alia, Lekić v. Slovenia [GC], no. 36480/07, § 108, 11 December 2018; and Strøbye and Rosenlind, cited above, § 93). 46. It is for the Court to finally determine whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with. It has to satisfy itself that the limitations imposed on the exercise of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate (see the above-cited cases of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, § 52, and Selahattin Demirtaş, § 387). 47. In addition, any conditions imposed must not thwart the “free expression of the people in their choice of legislature” (see Selahattin Demirtaş, cited above, § 388). In other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage. Any departure from the principle of universal suffrage 11